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Abstract
This Note discusses whether the attorney-client privilege applies to Japanese in-house legal
personnel who are not members of any country’s bar. Part I defines the attorney-client privilege,
and explains what communications the privilege protects. Part I also compares the legal systems
of Japan and the United States. Part II examines case law and commentary on the issue of applying
the privilege to non-US attorneys who are not admitted to any bar. Part III argues that the argu-
ments for applying the attorney-client privilege to non-US, non-bar in-house legal personnel are
particularly effective considering the structure of the Japanese legal system. This Note concludes
that US courts should apply the attorney-client privilege to Japanese corporate quasi-lawyers.
INVOKING THE U.S. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE:
JAPANESE CORPORATE QUASI-LAWYERS DESERVE
PROTECTION IN U.S. COURTS TOO
Jason Marin*
INTRODUCTION
In the multinational corporate world, corporations often
enter into international transactions.' Japanese corporations
frequently engage in transactions for the sale of goods in the
United States. 2 Japanese corporations either sell products di-
rectly to distributors or through a U.S. subsidiary.' U.S. plaintiffs
sometimes bring suit against the Japanese corporations.4 Be-
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1. See Lucinda A. Low, Virtually All Areas of Law Profession Face Globalization, NAT'L
L.J. Aug. 5, 1996, at C9 (explaining increase in international transaction frequency).
2. See Mitsuo Matsushita, A Japanese View of U.S. Trade Law, 8 NwJ. INT'L. L. & Bus.
29, 29 (1987) (explaining that United States is largest single nation market forJapanese
products). Japanese products sold in the United States include cars, personal electron-
ics, and fax paper. See Laura Fraedrich, The Japanese Minivan Antidumping Case: How
American Manufacturers Lost the Legal Battle But Won the War, 2 GEO. MASON L. REv. 107,
107 (discussing legal issues arising out of competition between U.S. and Japanese
minivan manufacturers); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 710 F.2d 806 (involving
legal issues arising with Japanese television manufacturer); United States v. Nippon
Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir., 1997) (discussingJapanese corporation sales of
fax paper in United States).
3. See OBTAINING DISCOVERY ABROAD; ANTITRUST TRIAL PRACTICE HANDBOOK SERIES,
ABA 14 (1990) (explaining non-U.S. corporation's use of U.S. subsidiaries, branches,
and affiliates). Most major Japanese banks, manufacturing companies, and trading
companies have U.S. subsidiaries. See E. Charles Routh, Litigation Between Japanese And
American Parties in CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN AND EAST ASIA
188, 189 (1978) (discussing bank and corporate subsidiary functions); see generally In re:
Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, (D.C. MDL No. 189) 723 F.2d 238, 251
nn.3 & 4 (3d Cir. 1983) rev'd, 475 U.S. 574 (1986) [hereinafter Japanese Electronic Prod-
ucts] (listing some subsidiaries of major Japanese corporations). Subsidiaries listed in-
clude Sony Corporation of America, a subsidiary of Sony Corporation; Mitsubishi Inter-
national Corp., a subsidiary of Mitsubishi Electric Corporation; Matsushita Electronics
Corporation of America ("MECA"), Matsushita Electric Trading Co., Matsushita Elec-
tric Corp., and Quasar Electronics Corp., subsidiaries of Matsushita Electric Industrial
Co., Ltd. Id.
4. See Daiske Yoshida, Note, The Applicability of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Commu-
nications with Foreign Legal Professionals 66 FoRDtAM L. Rv. 209, 209 (1997) (discussing
significant increase in U.S. suits involving non-U.S. parties). For example, a plaintiff
may challenge the selling practices of such Japanese corporations as violating the U.S.
antitrust laws. SeeJames W. Perkins, Comment, In Re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust
Litigation: Sovereign Compulsion, Act of State, and the Extraterritorial Reach of the United States
Antitrust Laws, 36 AM.U.L. REv. 721, 721 (1987) (discussing frequency of U.S. antitrust
suit against Japanese corporations); see also The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-
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cause the suits involve U.S. law, assuming personal jurisdiction5
can be found, the suits are brought in U.S. courts.6 U.S. courts
will apply the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil procedure,7 including
the rules for pre-trial discovery.8 The United States has special
7(1982) (defining and governing U.S. antitrust law); see The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 12-18 (1982) (covering monopolization through stock or asset acquisition). The fo-
cus of most U.S. antitrust cases tends to be on Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and
Sections 3 and 4 of the Clayton Act. See Perkins, supra, note 4, at n.1 (explaining use of
Clayton and Sherman Acts in antitrust cases). Japanese corporations are not excused
from U.S. antitrust law. Id. (explaining applicability of U.S. antitrust laws). The anti-
trust acts will be applied to U.S. foreign commerce as long as a substantial direct and
foreseeable effect restraining U.S. commerce exists. See Foreign Trade Antitrust Improve-
ment Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1982 & Supp. 1986) (creating stream of commerce
jurisdiction for U.S. antitrust cases). This issue can also arise if the Japanese corpora-
tion sues a U.S. corporation in U.S. court. See Gary D. Fox, Discovery from Japanese Compa-
nies, 22 TRiAL 18, 18 (Aug. 1986) (discussing applicability of attorney-client privilege to
Japanese corporate party to U.S. lawsuit, regardless of whether corporation is plaintiff
or defendant). The actual issue of the case does not change the issues regarding appli-
cability of the privilege. Id.
5. See Victoria A. Carter, Note, God Save the King: Unconstitutional Assertions of Per-
sonal Jurisdiction Over Foreign States in U.S. Courts, 82 VA. L. REv. 357, 357 (1996) (exam-
ining issues of personal jurisdiction over non-U.S. parties in U.S. courts). A court must
have personal jurisdiction over a party before the court can exercise any power over
that individual. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732 (1877). The court establishes
valid personal jurisdiction over an individual in one of two ways first, the defendant may
consent to the forum's jurisdiction; second, the defendant may have "minimum con-
tacts" with the forum. Id.
6. See Yoshida, supra note 4, at 210 (explaining U.S. antitrust plaintiffs' preference
for U.S. courts). The U.S. courts are preferable for a variety of reasons. Id. Procedural
differences make it more likely that an antitrust plaintiff can win in U.S. court. Id.
Juries in U.S. courts usually award larger damages than non-U.S. courts, and often
award multimillion-dollar damages. Id. at 209
7. See FED. R. Civ. P. § 14 (1993) (governing procedure for U.S. civil trials). If a
non-U.S. corporation or its U.S. subsidiary violates U.S. antitrust laws, it should be
treated no differently than a domestic corporation. Id. By reaping the benefits of busi-
ness contracts in the United States, the non-U.S. corporation should expect that they
might be sanctioned under U.S. law. Id.; see Perkins, supra note 4, at 725 (considering
U.S. antitrust law's application to non-U.S. parties). The United States and Japan have
entered into a Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty ("FCN Treaty"). See
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, .1953, U.S.-Japan, 4 U.S.T.
2063 (providing that Japanese companies engaging in business in United States will
receive same treatment as U.S. corporations). The FCN Treaty does not protect ajapa-
nese corporation from U.S. law, it only ensures that a corporation will receive equal
treatment under the law. See Beth Ann Isenberg, Note, The Evolving Conflict Between
Employment Discrimination Laws and Immunity Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and
Article VIII of the FCN Treaty Between The United States and Japan - The Papaila Case, 60 ALB.
L. REv. 1441, 1442 (1997) (examining the effects of the FCN treaty on employment
discrimination actions involving Japanese corporations in U.S. courts).
8. See FED. R. Crv. P. 26-36 (providing rules for discovery in U.S. courts); see Patent
Protection in Japan, East Asian Executive Reports, Dec. 15, 1997 [hereinafter E.A.E.R.]
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discovery rules for non-U.S. parties to a dispute.9 These special
rules outline the procedure for applying the normal federal dis-
covery rules to documents and individuals located in the non-
U.S. country.'0 The U.S. Department of State"' has defined a
procedure for taking evidence under the federal rules both from
willing and unwilling non-U.S. individuals. 12 Once discovery is
underway, the U.S. party usually requests all documents relating
to the case. 3 The Japanese corporation may resist producing
(defining pre-trial discovery as devices which may be used prior to trial to discover facts
and information relating to case and prepare for trial).
9. See OBTAINING DISCOVERY ABROAD, supra note 3, at 14 (explaining discovery
rules' applicability to non-U.S. parties). Persons taking evidence from a non-U.S.juris-
diction can follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the guidelines of the The
Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters ("Hague
Evidence Convention"). See Anna Torriente, Obtaining Extraterritorial Discovery in U.S.
Courts after Aerospatiale, 25 ARiz. Arr'v 35 (1989) (showing difference between Federal
Rules and Hague Evidence Convention discovery procedure); See THE CONVENTION ON
THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE ABROAD IN CIVIL OR COMMERCIAL MATTERS T.I.A.S. 7444, 23
U.S.T. 2555 (1972) [hereinafter HAGUE EVIDENCE CONVENTION]. The Hague Evidence
Convention is not the exclusive means of taking discovery from its signatories, but is the
preferred method because of international acceptance of the procedures. See Tor-
riente, supra note 9, at 35 (explaining international preference for Hague Evidence
Convention's procedures).
10. U.S. Dep't. of St., Obtaining Evidence in Japan (1997) [hereinafter ObtainingEvi-
dence] (providing rules for discovery from Japanese parties). If an individual or infor-
mation requested is within the United States, the Federal Rules of Discovery are nor-
mally applied. Id. Also, while special procedures are used to apply the rules, the court
does not change the rules themselves. Id.
11. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 980 (6th Edition, 1990) (defining Department of
State as executive department of United States which is responsible for foreign affairs
and trade).
12. See Obtaining Evidence, supra note 10 (stating special discovery rules' reach and
limitations). While the special discovery procedures are available, there is no way to
compel a non-U.S. defendant to comply with discovery. A willing individual is one who
agrees to discovery voluntarily, while a non-willing individual is one who resists discov-
ery. Id. This procedure also applies to individuals residing in the United States who are
not U.S. citizens. Id.
13. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (governing initial production requirements and
scope). Rule 26 (b)(1) provides
Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with these rules,
the scope of discovery is as follows: (1) In General. Parties may obtain discov-
ery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject mat-
ter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense
of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party,
including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location
of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and loca-
tion of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. The informa-
tion sought need not be admissible at the trial if the information sought ap-
pears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
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the documents and claim the attorney-client privilege for work
done by any corporate quasi lawyers. 4 The U.S. party may con-
test this claim on the grounds that the Japanese legal personnel
are not admitted to the Japanese bar. 15 The court must then
decide whether the attorney-client privilege applies to the Japa-
nese legal personnel. 16
This Note discusses whether the attorney-client privilege ap-
plies to Japanese in-house legal personnel who are not members
of any country's bar. Part I defines the attorney-client privilege,
and explains what communications the privilege protects. Part I
also compares the legal systems of Japan and the United States.
Part II examines case law and commentary on the issue of apply-
ing the privilege to non-U.S. attorneys who are not admitted to
any bar. Part III argues that the arguments for applying the at-
torney-client privilege to non-U.S., non-bar in-house legal per-
sonnel are particularly effective considering the structure of the
Japanese legal system. This Note concludes that U.S. courts
should apply the attorney-client privilege to Japanese corporate
quasi-lawyers.
I. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN U.S. AND JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEMS
The attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest common
law privileges in the United States.17 The Japanese legal system
Id.
14. See Renfield Corp. v. E. Remy Martin & Co., 98 F.R.D. 442 (Del. 1982) (holding
attorney-client privilege applies to non-bar in-house legal personnel); but see Honeywell
v. Minolta, 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis 5954 (N.J. 1990) (holding attorney-client privilege does
not apply to non-bar in-house legal personnel). In both Japan and the United States
corporations have quasi lawyers working in-house as legal personnel. See Alexander C.
Black, What Corporate Communications Are Entitled to Attorney-Client Privilege-Modern Cases
27 A.L.R. 5TH 76, 95 (1997) (explaining excessive in-house legal communications re-
quired for corporation to function properly). Legal personnel are corporate individu-
als employed to work on legal documents and give legal advice. See Yoshida, supra note
4, at 211 (explaining that non-lawyer legal professionals have expertise in patents, tax,
and corporate law). In many countries, non-bar legal professionals are the primary
source of legal advice. Id.
15. See Remy Martin, 98 F.R.D., at 443 (claiming privilege for French in-house legal
personnel). Minolta, 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis, at *1 (claiming privilege for Japanese in-
house legal personnel).
16. See Minolta, 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis at *1 (considering application of attorney-
client privilege to Japanese in-house legal personnel).
17. See Alison M. Hill, Note, A Problem of Privilege: In-House Counsel and the Attorney-
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does not recognize an attorney-client privilege.18 The existence
of an attorney-client privilege is just one of a number of differ-
ences between the U.S. and Japanese legal systems.19
A. Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege is a privilege that protects in-
formation given to, or received from, an attorney while seeking
legal advice.20  This privilege does not extend to communica-
tions made by or to an attorney acting in a non-legal capacity,
such as a business or personal adviser. 21 The attorney-client priv-
ilege is considered to be necessary for the U.S. legal system to
function properly. 22 Japan does not have an attorney-client priv-
ilege, but it does provide some discovery privileges that create a
limited counterpart for lawyers in Japan.23
Client Privilege in the United States and the European Community 27 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
145, 166 (1995) (examining development of attorney-client privilege at common law).
18. See Junya Naito, Joint Defense Privilege under Japanese Law, July 7 Memo, at 3
(1997) (explaining Japanese lack of attorney-client privilege) (on file with the Fordham
International Law Journal).
19. Masanobu Kato, The Role of Law and Lawyers in Japan and the United States 1987
BYU L. REv. 627, 651 (1987) (explaining differences between U.S. and Japanese legal
systems).
20. See Securities Exchange Council v. Gulf& Western Industries, Inc. 518 F. Supp.
675, 683 (D.C. Dist. 1981) [hereinafter Gulf & Western] (extending attorney-client priv-
ilege to legal advice only). Legal advice is defined as advice regarding compliance with
the law. Id. Advice regarding purely business or personal matters is not legal advice,
and is thereby not protected by the privilege. Id. at 681.
21. See id. at 683 (denying protection of attorney-client privilege to party failing to
show advice given was legal advice). The attorney-client privilege also does not protect
the underlying facts of the conversation, only the conversation itself. Grace M. Giesel,
The Legal Advice Requirement of the Attorney-Client Privilege: A Special Problem for In-House
Counsel and Outside Attorneys Representing Corporations, 48 MERCER L. REv. 1169, 1170
(1997) (explaining attorney-client privilege unquestionably applies to U.S. in-house
lawyers).
22. See Cynthia B. Feagan, Issues of Waiver in Multiple-Party Litigation: The Attorney-
Client Privilege and The Work Product Doctrine, 61 UMKC L. REv. 757, 759 (1993) (explain-
ing necessity of attorney-client privilege for U.S. lawyers to properly advise clients re-
garding U.S. law). This rational is based on three assumptions: that clients need to
consult lawyers, that lawyers require all relevant facts to properly advise the clients, and
that clients would not disclose these facts without the privilege. See Giesel, supra note
21, 1177 (recognizing that rational for attorney-client privilege is as old as privilege
itself).
23. DAN FENNO HENDERSON, THE ROLE OF LAWYERS in JAPAN: ECONOMIC SUCCESS
AND LEGAL SYSTEM 27, 60 (Baum ed, 1997) (discussing limited discovery privileges
under Japanese law).
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1. Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States
The attorney-client privilege has a long history in the com-
mon law of the United States.24 U.S. courts have defined a stan-
dard set of criteria which must be present fir the privilege to be
applied.2 5  The attorney-client privilege does apply to U.S. in-
house lawyers, 26 although the extent of this application is still
questioned by some U.S. courts.2 7
a. Definition and Evolution
The origin of the U.S. attorney-client privilege traces to
English common law. 2' The earliest recorded use of the attor-
ney-client privilege was in 1888.29 The attorney-client privilege is
one of the oldest common law communication confidentiality
privileges.3 ° The U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence 1 provides that
24. See Annesley v. Anglesea 17 How. St. Tr. 1139 (1743) (holding attorney-client
privilege necessary for English legal system to function); See also Unites States v. Zolin,
491 U.S. 554 (1989) (noting attorney-client privilege is rooted in U.S. jurisprudence
and derives from English common law prior to the birth of United States)
25. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F.Supp 357, 358 (D. Mass.
1950) (stating attorney-client privilege language which other U.S. courts have accepted
as standard). The privilege applies only if:
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the
person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a
court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is
acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attor-
ney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for
the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal
services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the pru-
pose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been claimed
and (b) not waived.
Id. at 358-59.
26. See Unites States v. Louisville & N.R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915) (applying
attorney-client privilege to communications with in-house lawyers).
27. See William L. Kandel, House Counsel: Ethics, Privilege, and Risks in Employment
Litigation, 16 EMPLOYEE RELATIONS LAW JOURNAL 517, 521 (1991) (noting that while
attorney-client privilege applies to corporate in-house counsel, many limitations to this
application exist).
28. See Paul R. Rice, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES at 9
(ed. 1993 & Supp. 1995) (discussing English common law origins of U.S. attorney-client
privilege)
29. See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (recognizing and justifying
attorney-client privilege). This is the first recorded use of the attorney-client privilege
in the United States. See Hill, supra note 17, at 167-68 (tracing early attorney-client
privilege use back to Hunt decision).
30. See Upjohn v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (recognizing attorney-client privi-
lege's historical importance as enabling attorneys to fully perform their duties).
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a witness shall have all privileges granted at common law.3 2  The
attorney-client privilege is also embodied as confidentiality re-
quirements in the rules of professional conduct of all U.S.
33states.
b. Rationale Behind the Privilege
There are two major justifications for the attorney-client
privilege. 4 The first is to encourage full and honest communi-
31. See FED. R. EVID. (governing rules of admissibility and production of evidence
in U.S. courts).
32. See FED. R. EVID. 501 (encoding all common law privileges). Rule 501 states
that
except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or pro-
vided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursu-
ant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State,
or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the com-
mon law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the
light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings,
with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies
the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State or
political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with state law.
Id.
33. See Carole Basri, Update on How In-House Counsel Can Use and Expand The Privi-
leges, in METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL 48 (1996) (explaining codification of at-
torney-client privilege). All states have adopted some form of the attorney-client privi-
lege. See Hill, supra note 17, at 168 n.108 (explaining confidentiality rules of Model
Code and Model Rules). By 1992, thirty-five states and the District of Columbia had
adopted the version of the privilege from the Model Rules. Id. The Model Rules state
that "a lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless
the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly author-
ized in order to carry out the representation .... " See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT, Rule 1.6 (1992) [hereinafter MODEL RULES] (providing rules by which all
attorneys must abide while within jurisdictions employing the rules). Other states have
adopted the privilege from the Model Code. See Hill, supra note 17, at 168 n.108 (ex-
plaining difference between Model Rules and Model Code attorney-client privilege).
The Model Code states "a lawyer should preserve the confidences and secrets of a cli-
ent." See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Cannon 4 (1983) (defining
confidences as information protected by privileges under applicable law and secrets as
information gained in professional relationship where disclosure would be embarrass-
ing or would likely be detrimental to clients). There are few situations when a U.S.
lawyer is allowed to reveal the confidence of a client, most notably to prevent a future
crime or presentation of false evidence to a court. See Unites States v. Zolin, 491 U.S.
554, 560 (1989) (explaining exceptions to confidentiality requirements of Model Rules
and Model Code).
34. See H. Lowell Brown, The Dilema of Corporate Counsel Faced with Client Misconduct:
Disclosure of Client Confidences or Constructive Discharge, 44 BUFFALO L. REv. 777, 782
(1996) (analyzing application by U.S. courts of attorney-client privilege to U.S. in-house
lawyers).
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cation between attorneys and their clients35 and thereby en-
courage broader observance of the law.36 Without the attorney-
client privilege, there is little motivation for an individual to fully
disclose information to his attorney.37 The second justification is
that the client should have autonomy as to who can have access
to his or her confidential information. Individuals communi-
cating with their attorneys must reasonably expect and intend
the communications to be confidential in order to qualify for
the privilege. 39
The party asserting the attorney-client privilege generally
must prove that the conversation was between a member of the
35. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. 389 (applying attorney-client privilege to in-house attor-
ney-made documents circulated to all employees). When attorneys give sound legal
advice, they promote the advancement of public ends by their clients. Id. at 384.
Sound legal advice cannot be rendered if the attorney is uninformed. Id.
36. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that the goal of improving compliance
with the law through uninhibited communication is the basis for the attorney-client
privilege in many ways. Id. The Supreme Court stated that the lawyer-client privilege
rests on the need for the advocate and counselor to know all that relates to the client's
reasons for seeking representation if the professional mission is to be carried out. See
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (noting that professional privilege's
purpose is to maximize representation by lawyers). The Court also held that the attor-
ney-client privilege's purpose is to encourage clients to make full disclosure to their
attorneys. See Fisher v. United States 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976). The Court has ex-
plained the attorney-client privilege as being "[f]ounded upon the necessity, in the in-
terest and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law
and skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of
when free from the consequences or the apprehension of such disclosure." See Hunt v.
Blackburn, 128 U.S. 470 (1888) (explaining necessity of attorney-client privilege for
lawyers to perform their legal functions efficiently).
37. See Giesel, supra note 21, at 1172 (explaining traditional attorney-client privi-
lege justification is to prevent non-disclosure by clients based upon fear of communica-
tion by attorney to third parties). Clients might not disclose information if their attor-
ney could be required to reveal this information later. Id. Similarly, a lawyer would be
less likely to aggressively seek information from clients if that lawyer knew there was a
chance that a court might force the lawyer to reveal this information. See Hill, supra
note 17, at 173. Clients would also have problems working within the U.S. legal system
if their lawyers gave them improper advice based on incomplete disclosure by the cli-
ents. Id.
38. See id. at 172 (considering whether corporations, and their in-house counsels
expect their communications to be confidential). One critic does not feel that auton-
omy regarding who has access to their communications should be applied to corpora-
tions. Id. This opinion holds that the attorney-client privilege is especially inappropri-
ate when dealing with in-house counsel. Id.
39. See Renfield Corp. v. E. Remy Martin & Co., 98 F.R.D. 442, 444 n.5 (Del. 1982)
(analyzing attorney-client privilege application criterion). Communications meet this
standard if "[t]he communicators did not expect the recipients to share the informa-
tion other than perhaps with outside counsel." Id.
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bar or his subordinate4" and a client.4' The communication
must also have been both for the acquisition of legal advice and
not have been made in the presence of others.4 2
c. Application to In-House Counsel
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the attorney-client privi-
lege does apply to in-house lawyers who are U.S. lawyers." Some
states, however, still do not grant in-house counsel broad attor-
40. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 11, at 994 (defining one's subordi-
nates as individuals occupying lower positions in recognized scales); see also Yoshida,
supra note 4, at 216 n.46 (recognizing that attorney-client privilege is applied to agents
of U.S. lawyer while individuals are working for lawyer).
41. See Charles R. Stevens, Multinational Corporations and the Legal Profession: The
Role of the Corporate Legal Department in Japan, in CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING Bust-
NESS IN JAPAN AND EAST ASIA 34, 38 (1978) (quoting recognized attorney-client privilege
requirements). The standard wording of the privilege requires that "[t]he asserted
holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client and.., the person to whom the
communication was made is ... a member of the bar or his subordinate." See United
States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950) (analyzing
attorney-client privilege requirements).
42. See United Shoe, 89 F. Supp, at 358 (explaining that attorney-client privilege
requirements are necessary to survive in complex legal environment of United States).
The terms of the privilege require "[t] he communications... [be made] (3) (b) without
the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion
on law or (ii) legal services .... " Id; see also Burroughs Welcome Co v. Barr Laborato-
ries, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 611, 615-16 (E.D.N.C. 1992) (listing examples of communications
not protected by attorney-client privilege). The attorney-client privilege is not ex-
tended to the following classifications of documents:
1) Client authorizations to file applications and take other steps necessary to
obtain registration;
2) Papers submitted to the Patent Office;
3) Compendiums of filing fees and requirements in the United States and
foreign countries for various types of applications;
4) Resumes of applications filed and registrations obtained or rejected includ-
ing dates and file or registration numbers;
5) Technical information communicated to the attorney but not calling for a
legal opinion or interpretation and meant primarily for aid in completing pat-
ent applications;
6) Business advice such as that related to product marketing;
7) Communications whose confidentiality [the client] -has waived;
8) Communications which pass through an attorney who acts only as a conduit
for a third party;
9) Transmittal letters or acknowledgment of receipt letters devoid of legal ad-
vice or requests for such advice and disclosing no privileged matters.
Id.
43. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390 (finding no difference between in-house lawyers
and independent counsel for purpose of applying attorney-client privilege). If the priv-
ilege was not extended to in-house counsel, it would make "it difficult for corporate
attorneys to formulate sound advice when their client is faced with a specific legal prob-
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ney-client privilege protection." Application of the attorney-cli-
ent privilege to in-house counsel has been limited in three
ways. 5 The privilege will not protect business advice given by
the legal counsel,46 communications given or seen by a non-nec-
essary individual,47 or information used previously in the corpo-
rations defense.4" The U.S. Supreme Court has not decided,
however, how the attorney-client privilege applies internation-
ally.49
2. Japanese Counterparts to U.S. Attorney-Client Privilege
Japan has rules which piece together a limited attorney-cli-
ent privilege."0 Japan has an ethics code which applies to all Jap-
lem" and "threatens to limit the valuable efforts of corporate counsel to ensure their
clients compliance with the law." Id. at 392.
44. See Yoshida, supra note 4, at 214 (explaining that some states do not recognize
the privilege for in-house counsel communications with corporate employees); see also
Henderson v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 113 F.R.D. 502 (N.D. IIl. 1986) (holding that
corporate in-house counsel do not expect their communications to be confidential and
are therefore not eligible for attorney-client privilege protection).
45. See UnitedJersey Bank v. Wolosoff, 196 NJ. Super. 553 (App. Div. 1984) (creat-
ing limitations on application of the attorney-client privilege for U.S. in-house counsel);
See also Basri, supra note 33, at 49 (explaining U.S. in-house lawyer attorney-client privi-
lege application is important because it encourages trust in corporate in-house counsel
by managers and directors of client corporations, who become more inclined to seek
legal advice).
46. See Wolosoff, 196 N.J. Super. at 553 (limiting attorney-client privilege to legal
advice, regardless of legal status of individual giving it); See also Basri, supra note 33, at
49 (recognizing in-house legal personnel privilege application limitations). Id. If legal
and business advice are mixed, they must be distinguished on the document in order to
be protected. Id.
47. See Wolosoff, 196 N.J. Super. at 553 (limiting protection to communications
held in presence of necessary individuals); See also Basri, supra note 33, at 49 (defining
non-necessary individual as. anyone without reasonable interest in communication).
This limitation addresses the expectancy of confidentiality. Id. If access to the docu-
ment or information is not limited, the individuals involved made no reasonable at-
tempts to keep it confidential. Id.
48. See Wolosoff 196 N.J. Super. at 552 (recognizing potential attorney-client privi-
lege waiver by in-house legal personnel). Once the information is revealed to the oppo-
nent and the court, the privilege has been waived. Id.
49. See Lawrence B. Friedman, More Foreign Firms File 1P Claims in US. Courts, NAT'L.
L. J., Oct. 28, 1996, at C34 (explaining that except for cases involving non-U.S. patent
agents, U.S. courts have not determined whether to extend attorney-client privilege to
communications with non-U.S. lawyers, even when communication would be privileged
in wholly domestic contexts).
50. See Henderson, supra note 23 at 60 (discussingJapanese rules of confidentiality
for lawyers governed by local bar association rules); see also Naito, supra note 18, at 4
(explaining that Japanese law requires Japanese lawyers to maintain information re-
ceived from clients as confidential).
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anese lawyers, 5 ' which are known as bengoshi.5 2  The ethics code
provides that bengoshi have a right and an obligation to maintain
the confidentiality of any facts or documents acquired during
the course of his duties. 3 Any documents possessed by the
bengoshi are free from seizure 4 or discovery,15 however docu-
ments created by a bengoshi and held by the client do not receive
this protection.5 6  Similarly, Japan's old Code of Civil Proce-
dure 5 7 ("CCP") grants a privilege for any information given or
received in the course of professional duties by a bengoshi,
benrishi,58 doctor, dentist, or other professional. 5' This privilege,
51. See BENGOSHI Ho [Lawyers Law], Law no. 205 of June 10, 1949 (Japan) (gov-
erning rights and limitations of bengoshi under Japanese law); see EHS Vol II, CA, No.
2040 (providing English translation of the Bengoshi Ho). The Bengoshi rinri (Lawyers
Ethics) is contained in the Bengoshi Ho and proscribes unseemly advertising, delaying
litigation, conflicts of interest, and other similar activities. See Henderson, supra note
23, at 60 (explaining that while Bengoshi rinri and Bengoshi Ho are not applicable to in-
house legal personnel, most individuals follow rules and guidelines contain within
them).
52. See Henderson, supra note 23, at 28 (translating bengoshi as lawyer). Although
bengoshi has been commonly translated as lawyer, barrister would be a more accurate
translation. See Richard S. Miller, Apples v. Persimmons: The Legal Profession in Japan, 39 J.
LEGAL ED. 27, 28 (1989) (noting that U.S. equivalent of barrister is litigator); see also
West, supra note 85, at 1458 (explaining bengoshi roles). A barrister is a British lawyer
who argues before the court. See BLACK'S LAw DIcrIoNARY, supra note 11, at 151 (defin-
ing barristers as British bar members).
53. See BENGOSHI Ho, supra note 51, art. 23 (defining bengoshi secrecy rights and
responsibilities). The Bengoshi Ho asserts that "a lawyer or a person who was previously a
lawyer shall have the right and responsibility of maintaining the secrecy of any facts he
came to know in performing his business. Provided that this shall not apply when
otherwise provided for by laws." Id.
54. See BLACK's LAw DicrioNARY, supra note 11, at 1359 (defining seizure as taking
of property by governmental officials under-authority of courts).
55. See Naito, supra note 18, at 3 (summarizing Japanese discovery privileges that
protect documents held by bengoshi). The protection of documents held by bengoshi
extends even to a seizure by the Japan Federal Trade Commission ('JFTC"). Id.
56. See id. (describing the extent ofJapanese document privileges for bengoshi and
technical secrets).
57. See Minji Sosho-ho (Code of Civil Procedure), Law no. 29 of 1890, as amended
by Law no. 30 of Apr. 2, 1992 (Japan) [hereinafter CCP] (establishing rules for civil
trials in Japanese courts); see EHS Vol II, LA, No. 2300 (providing English translation
of the CCP).
58. See Yoshida, supra note 4, at 220 (defining benrishi as Japanese patent agents
and explaining their functions); see also E.A.E.R., supra note 8, at n.2 (analyzing Japa-
nese systems of patent prosecution and protection).
59. See CCP, supra note 57, art. 281 (setting forth right against testifying to infor-
mation which professionals receive during performance of professional duties). A wit-
ness may refuse to testify in the following situations:
In case a doctor, dentist, pharmacist, druggist, mid-wife, [bengoshi] (including
a foreign solicitor), patent attorney, advocate, notary public or an occupant of
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however, does not prevent the non-professional in the conversa-
tion from being required to testify regarding the conversation.6 °
The New CCP 61 grants a privilege for work done primarily for
the benefit of the holder of a document.6 2 One scholar believes
that this defense will allow certain attorney generated docu-
ments to. be privileged.
B. Difference Between Japanese and U.S. Legal Systems
There are many differences between the Japanese and U.S.
legal systems." The legal education systems of the two countries
and the process by which lawyers become licensed creates major
differences between the systems.65 The differences in education
lead to a difference between the types of individuals that are
called lawyers in Japan and the United States. 66 Finally the civil
trial procedure rules, especially those for pre-trial discovery, dif-
fer greatly between the two countries.67
1. Legal Education
Legal education in Japan is different than that in the United
a post connected with religion or worship or a person who was once in such
profession is questioned regarding the facts which came to his knowledge in
the course of performance of his duties and which should be kept secret ....
Id.
60. See Obtaining Discovery Abroad, supra note 3, at 138 (restricting application of
attorney-client privilege to individuals who are professionals). A professional is an indi-
vidual engaged in an occupation requiring a high level of training and proficiency. See
BLAcKs LAW DIcrIoNARY, supra note 11, at 1210 (defining professional as individuals
engaged in learned professions)
61. See MINJI SOSHO-HO (Code of Civil Procedure) Law No. 109 of 1996 (effective
Jan 1, 1998) (Japan) [hereinafter NEW CCP] (revising Japanese civil trial procedures).
See also Caryl Ben Basat International Legal Developments in Review: 1996 Business Transac-
tions and Disputes, 31 Int'l Law. 245, 255 (1997) (explaining equivalent of attorney-client
privielge under New CCP). - .
62. See NEW CCP, supra note 61. art. 220 (creating primary use beneficiary discov-
ery exception); see also Naito, supra note 18, at 2 (summarizing New CCP).
63. See Naito, supra note 18, at 5 (explaining that Japanese courts have not yet
applied New CCP privileges to in-house legal personnel).
64. See Henderson, supra note 23, at 50-52 (discussing how differences between
U.S. and Japanese legal systems create difficulties for U.S. corporations attempting to
do business in Japan).
65. See Miller, supra note 52, at 30 (explaining that Japanese legal education
predominantly occurs at lower levels of school than U.S. education).
66. See Henderson, supra note 23, at 31 (analyzing Japanese bar and non-bar legal
professionals).
67. See Torriente, supra note 9, at 36 (contrasting U.S. common law and civil law
discovery systems).
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States.6 8 The most notable difference between the Japanese and
U.S. legal education systems may be that a law degree in Japan is
predominantly an undergraduate one.6 9 Law courses are often
electives, and are mixed with liberal arts and political science
courses. 70 In Japan, many students of law have no intention of
taking the bar 7 but rather intend to gain employment from a
corporation or the government.7 2 Even law professors are sel-
dom licensed to practice law. 73 Much of the difference in educa-
tion is attributed to the low passing rate of the Japanese bar
exam,74 and the fact that most corporations will hire graduates
directly from law school without requiring them to take the bar
exam. 75 Corporations place these graduates into positions simi-
68. See Miller, supra note 52, at 29 (contrasting U.S. and Japanese legal education
systems).
69. See id. at 30 (comparing Japanese law major to U.S. english and economics
majors).
70. See Henderson, supra note 23, at 56 (listing course requirements for Japanese
legal degree). The Japanese law degree curriculum usually requires that a student take
constitutional law, administrative law, civil law, commercial law, criminal law, criminal
procedure, civil procedure, and international law. See Kato, supra note 19, at 629 n.4
(listing Japanese Education Department recommended law curriculum courses). Elec-
tive courses usually include labor or social law, economic or industrial law (including
antitrust), bankruptcy law, judicial administration, foreign (comparative) law, legal his-
tory, philosophy of law, sociology of law, criminology, political science, science of public
administration, political history, and economics. Id. Scholars maintain that legal
courses in Japan use a lecture format and do not present students with analytical train-
ing. See Kato, supra note 19, at 631 (explaining Japanese legal education's focus). The
focus of Japanese undergraduate legal courses is on the interpretation of legislative
texts and legal theories. Id. U.S. law school courses, however, focus more on problem
analysis. Id. The training offered at U.S. law schools involves analysis of cases through
the Socratic Method, or interactive teaching. See id. at 630. U.S. legal education is
unique in this aspect and most non-U.S. nations use lecture style classes. Id. at 630 n.7.
U.S. legal education teaches students to be more problem oriented than Japanese law
students. Id. at 630. The presence of ajury system creates a requirement that U.S. law
students learn arguing skills. Id. at 631. Because there is no jury system in Japan, Japa-
nese legal students do not need these skills. Id.
71. See Miller, supra note 52, at 30 (explaining goals of Japanese undergraduate
law students).
72. See id. at 30 (listing small amount of undergraduate law students considering
law as prospective occupation).
73. See id. at 29 (describing Japanese legal professors' as non-bengoshi). Often, un-
dergraduate legal courses are taught by political scientists rather than law professors.
Id.
74. See Edward I. Chen, The National Law Examination ofJapan, 39J. LEGAL EDUC. 1,
5 (1989) (describing Japanese entrance and bar exams). In 1984, the passing rate of
the Japanese entrance exam was only 1.9%. Id. at 9.
75. See Miller, supra note 52, at 31 (describing Japanese corporate hiring prac-
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lar to an in-house attorney in the United States. 76 Those gradu-
ates who want to become bengoshi must take the shiho shiken 77 in
order to attend the Legal Training and Research Institute
("LTRI") .7 The shiho shiken is the hardest part of the Japanese
legal education and only about two percent of applicants pass.79
tices). Japanese society does not consider legal personnel any less prestigeous because
they have not taken the entrance exam. Id.
76. See id. at 31 (comparing U.S. and Japanese in-house legal personnel work).
77. See Henderson, supra note 23, at 56 (explaining shiho shiken and its purpose).
The shiho shiken is the equivalent of the U.S. law schools' Law School Admissions Test
("LSAT"). Id. Passing the shiho shiken is the primary requirement to become a bengoshi.
Id.
See generally Chen, supra note 74 (explaining shiho shiken in great detail). The shiho
shiken is given to applicants to students in two stages. Id. at 5. The first stage is a written
exam which any Japanese citizen may take. Id. This exam tests individuals on materials
equivalent to a second year undergraduate curriculum in law. Id. at 5-6. Individuals
who pass this exam, or who are exempted from taking it, may take the second exam. Id.
at 6. Exemptions to the first exam are given to individuals who have a baccalaureate,
have graduated from a higher education institution, have passed the exam at an earlier
date, or who possess qualifications equivalent to the other three. See THE EDUCATION
LAw, Law No. 26 of 1947 (defining educational standards and regulations). The sec-
ond exam consists of written and oral sections. See Chen, supra note 74, at 6 (explain-
ing the second stage of the shiho shiken). The written portion of the exam tests the
individual's knowledge of the constitutional and civil code as well as criminal or civil
procedure. Id. The exam also has two sections which test on topics of the individual's
choice. Id. One section tests the individual on one of civil or criminal procedure (the
one not tested earlier), administrative law, bankruptcy law, labor law, public or private
international law, or criminal policy. Id. The other section tests the individual on his or
her choice of political science, economics, public finance, accounting, psychology, eco-
nomic policy, or social policy. Id. If an individual passes the written exam, then he or
she is then orally examined by teams of two examiners on each of the same subjects. Id.
at 7. The individual is quizzed on each subject for fifteen to twenty minutes. Id. The
examiners determine which individuals pass the exam, and deliberately limit the
number who do so, by setting a maximum number of passing applicants. Id. The
number of passing individuals is limited because of financial reasons. See Fujita, supra
note 90 (discussing governmental financial bengoshi expenses). Once admitted to the
Legal Training and Research Institute ("LTRI"), the student becomes a legal appren-
tice and gets a monthly stipend equivalent to a first year civil servant's salary as well as
family support. See Chen, supra note 74, at 18 (noting governmental requirement that
LTRI students take no employment).
78. See Ted Holden, The Japanese Solution: Kill all the Lawsuits, Bus. WK., Apr. 13,
1992, at 64 (showing small percentage of applicants admitted). The LTRI is the only
graduate level law school in Japan. Henderson, supra note 23, at 56 (describing LTRI
purpose and unique status). Students who enter the LTRI begin long specialized train-
ing. Id. Only graduates of LTRI can become bengoshi. SeeJ. Mark Ramseyer, The Costs
of the Consensual Myth: Antitrust Enforcement and Institutional Barriers to Litigation in Japan,
94 YALE L.J. 604, 632 (1985) (explaining LTRI limitation on bengoshi numbers).
79. See Henderson, supra note 23, at 56 (stating how passing rate affects number of
bengoshi). Some figures state that of 30,000 applicants approximately 500 pass. See
Mark A. Behrens, Japan's New Product Liability Law: The Citadel of Strict Liability Falls, But
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At LTRI, law students learn the analytical approach to law taught
at U.S. law schools. 80 Almost all of the students who are admit-
ted to LTRI pass the exit exams and graduate." By contrast, in
the United States, there are a large number of graduate law
schools making it easier for U.S. students to enter law school
than students in Japan.82 The difficulty of law school exams and
the U.S. bar, however, limits the number of U.S. lawyers.8"
2. Attorneys
One particularly important issue regarding the difference
between U.S. and Japanese legal systems is the difference be-
tween U.S. and Japanese attorneys.8 4 There are far more li-
censed lawyers in the United States than in Japan.8" While the
Access to Recovery is Limited by Formidable Barriers, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L. Bus. L. 669, 678
(1995) (examining entrance exam passing rates). The number of applicants admitted
has increased in recent years, and in 1995, over 700 were admitted. See Henderson,
supra note 23, at 56 (noting small increase in number of applicants admitted to LTRI
since 1991). In contrast the U.S. passing rates ranged between 66% and 89.9% (by
state) by 1995 figures. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, A REVIEW OF LEGAL EDUCATION
IN THE U.S. 39-40 (1994) [hereinafter AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION] (examining U.S. bar
exam passing rates by state).
80. See Miller, supra note 52, at 37 (explaining LTRI training). The training at
LTRI consists of two years classroom study, eight months at court, four months at a
procurators office, four months at a law office and finally four more months class study.
See Henderson, supra note 23, at 56 (describing five LTRI training stages and their
purposes in Japanese legal education system).
81. See Chen, supra note 74, at 18 (noting that most students pass LTRI exit exams,
and those who fail may wait one year and take these exams again).
82. See BARRON'S GUIDE TO LAW SCHOOLS 11-23 (12th ed., 1997) (surveying all
ABA-accredited law schools). The United States currently has 179 ABA accredited law
schools. Id. The large number of law schools gives a wide variety of individuals access
to legal education. Id. at 44.
83. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 79, at 66 (calculating average an-
nual U.S. law school admittance and graduation statistics). There were 128,989 stu-
dents admitted to law school in ajuris doctor program in 1995, while only 39,710 re-
ceived theirJ.D. in the same year. Id; see also Law School Admission Council, THE OFFI-
CIAL GUIDE TO U.S. LAw SCHOOLS 5 (1997) (analyzing U.S. law school admittance and
graduation statistics and arriving at same results as American Bar Association).
84. See Miller, supra note 52, at 27 (discussing difference between roles of lawyers
in U.S. and Japanese legal systems).
85. See Holden, supra note 78, at 64 (comparing larger number of U.S. lawyers to
smaller number of Japanese lawyers); see also Nancy L. Young, Comment, Japan's New
Products Liability Law, 18 Lov. L. A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 893, 904 (1996) (analyzing effect
on litigation of small number of attorneys); Mark D. West, The Pricing of Shareholder
Derivative Actions in Japan and the United States, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1436, 1458 (1994)
(noting that number of lawyers affects derivative actions). The limited number ofattor-
neys makes it unlikely for a shareholder to learn of his or her liabilities. Id. at 1426.
Japan had only 15,541 licensed lawyers in 1995 while the United States had over
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large U.S. population is proposed as a main cause of this dispar-
ity,8 6 scholars contend that the different structures of the legal
profession in the two countries is the true cause.8 7 In the United
States, licensed lawyers perform various services in a wide range
of areas.88 In Japan, however, bengoshi perform only a limited
number of services.8 9  The most notable service is that only
bengoshi may argue before a court.9 ° The rest of the functions
850,000. See Henderson, supra note 23, at 30 (setting forth lawyer numbers per capita
in Japan and United States). This means that Japan had approximately one lawyer for
every 8000 people while the United States had one for every 300 people. Id.
86. See Miller, supra note 52, at 28 (analyzing various proposed reasons for differ-
ence in number of lawyers between Japan and the United States).
87. See Henderson, supra note 23, at 31-32 (discussing differences between organi-
zations of legal professions in United States and Japan).
88. See id. at 31 (describing functions performed by U.S. lawyers). U.S. lawyers are
involved in management, government, and business. Id. Lawyers often are placed in
managerial positions, such as the head of a department. Id. Many U.S. political offices
are held by lawyers. Id. In the business world, U.S. lawyers hold positions in many
industries at all levels, including positions as salespersons, business executives, real es-
tate or stock brokers, and full time investors. See Miller, supra note 52, at 28 (discussing
wide range of occupations in which U.S. lawyers are engaged that fall outside the nor-
mally understood boundaries of legal profession, including musicians, poets, and teach-
ers as well as positions in business). U.S. lawyers are also intricately involved in the
drafting of documents. See Henderson, supra note 23, at 32 (explaining U.S. lawyer's
function as primary drafter of legal documents). In Japan, bengoshi are rarely involved
in any of the U.S. lawyers' capacities except litigation. See Kato, supra note 19, at 647-51
(describing functions of bengoshi in Japan).
89. See West, supra note 85, at 1458 (listing bengoshi functions). The bengoshi fill the
roles ofjudges, procurators (civil litigators), and government attorneys (criminal prose-
cutors). See Miller, supra note 52, at 31 (explaining limited bengoshi work areas).
90. See Miller, supra note 52, at 28 (explaining effect of lawyers law on non-
bengoshi). The Bengoshi Ho does not prohibit corporations from employing non-bengoshi
to perform legal work or give legal advice. See BENGOSHI Ho, supra note 51, art. 72
(granting bengoshi exclusive right to perform legal work for general public). See also
Yasuhiro Fujita, Honsha hombu no bukacho wa Beikoku no In-House Counsel tomaji Attorney-
client privilege o shucho dekiruka [Do Bucho (Managers) or Kacho (Department Heads) of
Legal Department of the Headquarters of a Japanese Company Have the Same Attor-
ney-Client Privilege as That of In-House Counsels in a U.S. Company?], 21(4) SHOJI
HOMU 410, 410 (1993) (presenting arguments for granting attorney-client privilege
protection to Japanese in-house legal personnel). In the United States, however, state
law prohibits non-lawyers from practicing law in any capacity. See e.g. NY CLSJuD § 484
(1997) (prohibiting non-lawyers from practicing law in New York State). Section 484
provides in the relevant part
No natural person shall ask or receive, ... compensation for appearing
... as attorney in any court or... for preparing... instruments affecting real
estate, . . . or any other instrument affecting the disposition of property after
death .... or pleadings of any kind in any action brought before any court...
or make it a business to practice for another as an attorney ....
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performed by U.S. licensed attorneys are performed by other
legal professionals in Japan.91 These quasi-lawyers have earned
their LL.B.92 from a Japanese undergraduate university, but did
not take the bar exam.93 The individuals who work in-house for
a corporation often supplement their education with lectures,
and generally spend their entire career in a Japanese corpora-
tions' legal department.94
3. Discovery Systems
Japan and the United States have different legal systems. 95
The United States is a common law country.9 6 Japan is a civil law
country. 7 Although both countries have discovery, the rules
91. See Henderson, supra note 23 at 32-36 (defining quasi-lawyers asJapanese legal
professionals who have not taken Japanese bar exam). The quasi-lawyers include Zeiri-
shi (tax agents), Ben-rishi (patent agents), Shiho Shoshi (judicial scriveners), Konin Kaikei-
shi (certified public accountants), Gyosei Shoshi (governmental scriveners), Kosho-nin
(notaries), and Kigyo Homu-in (in-house counsel). See Miller, supra note 52, at 28-29
(explaining quasi-lawyer expertise areas); See also Kato, supra note 19, at 651 (describ-
ing quasi-lawyer functions and roles in society).
92. See Miller, supra note 52, at 30 (defining LL.B. as undergraduate Japanese legal
degree).
93. See id. (tracking quasi-lawyer education). Most graduates of undergraduate law
programs consider taking the bar an unnecessary waste of time and effort. Id. at 31. A
corporation in Japan will usually hire the best law students directly out of undergradu-
ate school. Id.
94. See Stevens, supra note 41, at 38 (suggesting most corporations are members of
International Business Law Institute). The International Business Law Institute holds
weekly meetings and lectures to which'all members can send their legal personnel. Id.
The International Business Law Institute also has an extensive law library which mem-
ber's legal personnel may use. Id.
95. See Torriente, supra note 9, at 36 (discussing differences between civil law legal
systems and U.S. legal system).
96. See BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY, supra note 11, at 189 (explaining common law
legal systems as being comprised of law based on tradition and prior decisions). Com-
mon law countries use a system based on the concept of following prior decisions to
enable the courts to define the law. See Martin A. Voet, Patent Litigation in Civil Law
Countries, 366 PLI/Pat 95, 98 (1993). The decisions are made after weighing evidence
presented in an adversarial trial. Id. at 98. Judges in this system are chosen from the
body of lawyers. Id. Many present and former members of the British Commonwealth
are common law countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Ireland,
and Australia. Id. at 97.
97. See BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY, supra note 11, at 168 (defining civil law as law
based on statutes concerning private rights and remedies); see also Gregory P. Sreenan,
Blocking Statutes and Their Effect on American-Style Discovery Abroad, 25-FALL BRIEF 59, 61
(1995) (explaining thatJapan follows civil law traditions); see also Voet, supra note 96, at
98 (explaining decisions of court in civil law legal systems as based predominantly on
written arguments presented by parties to judges). Judges in civil law countries have
little or no advocacy experience. Id. Instead they are appointed asjudges directly out
1998] JAPANESE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 1575
governing discovery in the two countries vary greatly.9 8 The
United States offers extensive pre-trial discovery,99 the rules of
which are derived from British common law.100 Japanese discov-
ery, however is handled entirely at the trial stage and is based
strongly on the German system 01 Japanese pre-trial discovery is
more limited than that of the United States, and is used only for
the preservation of evidence.1 0
2
a. U.S. Pretrial Discovery
The U.S. rules of discovery are designed to provide parties
to a litigation with all facts relevant to the case. 103 The current
discovery rules were developed through the decisions of U.S.
courts, and English courts before the United States existed.0 4
The U.S. rules are codified in the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
of law school or equivalent educational body. Id. Civil law countries include France,
Italy, Spain, Belgium, and countries that were their colonies, including those in Latin
America, South America, and French Africa. Id. at 97. Germanic countries such as
Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands are also civil law countries. Id. at 97.
98. See Todd B. Carver, ADR-The Competitive Imperative, 561 PLI/Lit 59, 63 (1997)
(noting disadvantages of bringing international suit in Japanese court instead of U.S.
court due to discovery limitations).
99. See Behrens, supra note 79, at 706 (discussing various U.S. discovery forms in-
cluding depositions, written interrogatories and document requests). The U.S. litigant
has extensive means to investigate his or her opponent's case. Id.
100. See Black, supra note 14, at 95 (explaining history of attorney-client privilege
in United States).
101. See West, supra note 85, at 1417 (1994) (explaining Japanese trial discovery
procedures). Discovery in Japan is handled by the judge. Id. This is not uncommon as
few countries other than the United States have extensive pre-trial discovery.. See Marcy
Shienwold, Comment, International Products Liability Law, 1 TouRoJ. TRANSNAT'L L. 257,
258 (1988) (showing that U.S. discovery system is unlike systems used in other areas of
world).
102. See Ethan Horowitz, Foreign Trademark Practice, C602 ALI-ABA 27, 57 (1991)
(reviewing non-U.S. discovery practices in various nations). Preservation of evidence is
a limited procedure for a court to examine witnesses or property that may not be avail-
able at the time of trial. See Itsuko Mori, The Difference Between US. Discovery and Japanese
Taking of Evidence, 12 INT'L LAw. 3, 3 (1989) (explaining that preservation of evidence is
mostly used when evidence will be lost through death or disappearance of key wit-
nesses). Article 343 of the old CCP provides, "[t]he court may, if it considers that there
exist such circumstances as making the use of evidence in question difficult unless ex-
aminations thereof is made beforehand conduct examination of evidence on motion in
accordance with the provisions of this Chapter." See CCP, supra note 57, art. 343 (pro-
viding for preservation of evidence in cases in Japanese courts).
103. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S.495, 515 (1947) (stating that parties' use of
attorney-client privilege to determine relevant inforrhation is acceptable use).
104. See Sreenan, supra note 97, at 59 (comparing U.S. pretrial discovery to discov-
ery systems of other nations, including England).
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dure. 10 5
i. History and Purpose
The U.S. rules of pre-trial discovery are derived from Eng-
lish common law. 116 The U.S. rules have developed well beyond
the English common law, and are much broader. 11 7 U.S. pre-
trial discovery is designed to allow a party to develop his or her
case after the complaint is filed.'1 8 It is also designed to increase
the likelihood of settlement'0 9 and reduce the risk of surprises" 0
during the trial.' It is much broader than discovery in other
countries, even countries that are based on common law.' 12 In-
dividuals involved in the Japanese legal system criticize U.S. style
discovery as resulting in unnecessary law suits.1
3
105. See FED. R. Crv. P. 26-37 (defining discovery procedures for civil trials in U.S.
courts).
106. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. at 515 (describing U.S. pre-trial discovery
origins). U.S. pre-trial discovery rules have their earliest origins in the English Chan-
cery Practice's equity bill of discovery. Id.
107. See Donald C. Dowling Jr., What to do When You Need Discovery Abroad 2(1)
FEDERAL DISCOVERY NEWS (1995) (discussing increase necessity of international discov-
ery in U.S. cases). Discovery is handled more strictly in all non-U.S. countries, where it
is handled predominantly at the trial stage. Id.
108. See Young, supra note 85, at 899 (explaining broader use of discovery by U.S.
courts than Japanese courts in order to discover relevant facts). The purpose of broad
use of discovery is to provide a party with access to anything that will be evidence in his
case. See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 515 (explaining conflict between attorney-client privilege
and discovery purpose).
109. See Maurice Rosenberg, The 50th Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 1938-1988: IV. The Federal Rules in Practice: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Action:
Asserting Their Impact. 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2197, 2198 (1989) (examining application of
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure since enactment).
110. See id. at 2198 (explaining that with secrets and important information re-
vealed, realistic negotiations would begin). See also Edward J. Imwinkelried The Worst
Surprise of All: No Right to Pretrial Discovery of the Prosecution's Uncharged Misconduct Evi-
dence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 247, 250 (1986) (explaining that pre-trial discovery's primary
function is to allow defendants to prepare to meet any evidence plaintiffs bring).
111. See Sreenan, supra note 97, at 59 (explaining purposes of U.S. discovery as
supporting search for truth by full disclosure of relevant facts).
112. See Dowling, supra note 107, at 44 (explaining other countries' strict discovery
rules). Non-U.S. common law countries place restrictions on the amount and type of
discovery that is allowed. Id. Civil law countries have stricter rules which allow little pre-
trial discovery. Id. In these countries, discovery is handled almost exclusively by the
judge during the trial. Id.
113. See Young, supra note 85, at 899 (discussing Japanese beliefs and concerns
about U.S. style discovery). Japanese scholars believe that fishing expeditions for infor-
mation are legally sanctioned by the U.S. discovery rules. Id.
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ii. Current Status
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure114 ("FRCP") govern
U.S. pre-trial discovery. 15 These procedures include document
requests,"' written interrogatories, 117 permission to enter land
for inspection, 1  physical and mental examination, 9 requests
114. FED. R. Cxv. P. (governing all parts of U.S. civil trials, including jurisdiction,
discovery, and damages).
115. See Behrens, supra note 79, at 706 (identifying U.S. discovery forms).
116. See FED. R. Cv. P. 34(a) (governing document production). Rule 34(a) states
that
Any party may serve on any other party a request (1) to produce and permit
the party making the request, or someone acting on the requestor's behalf, to
inspect and copy, any designated documents (including writings, drawings,
graphs, charts, photographs, phono records, and other data compilations
from which information can be obtained, translated, if necessary, by the re-
spondent through detection devices into reasonably usable form), or to in-
spect and copy, test or sample any tangible things which constitute or contain
matters within the scope of rule 26(b) and which are in the possession, cus-
tody or control of the party upon whom the request is served.
Id.
117. See FED. R. Crv. P. 33 (providing for discovery by written interrogatories).
Rule 33 allows any party, without leave of the court or written stipulation to
serve upon any other party written interrogatories, not exceeding 25 in
number including all discrete sub-parts, to be answered by the party served or,
if the party served is a public or private corporation or a partnership or associ-
ation or governmental agency, by any officer or agent, who shall furnish such
information as is available to the party.
Id.
118. See FED. R. Civ. P. 34 (governing entry upon land for inspection). Rule 34
requires a party
to permit entry upon the designated land or other property in the possession
or control of the party upon whom the request is seived for the purpose of
inspection and measuring, surveying, photographing, testing or sampling the
property or any designated object or operation thereon within the scope of
Rule 26(b).
Id.
119. See FED. R. CIv. P. 35 (governing physical and mental examinations of per-
sons). Rule 35 states that
when the mental or physical condition (including the blood group) of a party
or of a person in the custody or under the legal control of a party, is in contro-
versy, the court in which the action is pending may order the party to submit
to a physical or mental examination by a suitably licensed or certified exam-
iner or to produce for examination the person in the party's custody or legal
control. The order may be made only on motion for good cause shown and
upon notice to the person to be examined and to all parties and shall specify
the time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of the examination and the
person or persons by whom it is to be made.
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for admission, 20  and the taking of depositions. 121  Discovery
from non-U.S. defendants is either taken according to these
rules 122 or according to the Convention on the Taking of Evi-
dence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters121 ("Hague Evi-
dence Convention").124 Because Japan is not a signatory to the
Hague Evidence Convention, in a case involving Japanese and
U.S. parties both parties must take evidence according to the
120. See FED. R. Civ. P. 36 (governing requests for admission). Rule 36 states that
[a] party may serve upon any other party a written request for the admission,
for purposes of the pending action only, of the truth of any matters within the
scope of Rule 26 (b) (1) set forth in the request that relate to statements or
opinions of fact or of the application of law to fact, including the genuineness
of any documents described in the request. Copies of documents shall be
served with the request unless they have been or are otherwise furnished or
made available for inspection and copying.
Id.
121. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30 (governing depositions upon oral examination). Rule
30 states that "(1) a party may take the testimony of any person, including a party, by
deposition upon oral examination without leave of the court except as provided in
paragraph (2). The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by subpoena." Id. Sub-
section (2) lists situations in which permission of the court is needed for the taking of a
deposition. Id.
122. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f) (governing service upon individuals in other coun-
tries). Rule 4(f) provides that
[u]nless otherwise provided by federal law, service upon an individual from
whom a waiver has not been obtained and filed, other than an infant or an
incompetent person, may be effected in a place not within any judicial district
of the United States:
(1) by any internationally agreed means reasonably calculated to give notice,
such as those means authorized by the Hague Convention on the Service
abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents; or
(2) if there is not internationally agreed means of service or the applicable
international agreement allows other means of service, provided that service is
reasonably calculated to give notice.
Id. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure must be used in conjunction with the guide-
lines of the State Department. See Obtaining Evidence, supra note 10, at 2 (explaining use
of federal discovery rules in cases involving Japanese parties).
123. See HAGUE EVIDENCE CONVENTION, supra note 9 (providing for pretrial discov-
ery for parties of different nations).
124. See Jacques E. Soiret, The Foreign Defendant: Overview of Principles Governing Ju-
risdiction, Venue, Extraterritorial Service of Process and Extraterritorial Discovery in U.S. Courts,
28 TORT & INS. L.J. 533, 566 (1993) (explaining application of Hague Evidence Conven-
tion to cases involving parties of different nationalities). The Hague Evidence Conven-
tion is not an exclusive means of taking evidence from non-U.S. parties. See generally
Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. District Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987)
(noting that language of Hague Evidence Convention allows for other forms of eviden-
tiary taking, though these types are not defined); see also Soiret, supra, at 571 (explain-
ing discovery procedures under Hague Evidence Convention, with focus on letters of
request as preferred form of discovery).
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FRCP.1 25
Depositions of non-U.S. defendants are taken in one of four
ways. 126 These methods are called notice, 12 7 commission,' 28 stip-
125. See Fox, supra note 4, at 18 (summarizing procedures for discovery from Japa-
nese corporations). Japan and the United States are both signatories to the Convention
on Service Abroad ofJudicial and Extra-judicial Documents in Civl or Commercial Mat-
ters. See CONVENTION ON SERVICE ABROAD OF JUDICIAL AND EXTRA-JUDICIAL DOCUMENTS
IN CIVIL OR COMMERCIAL MATTERS 658 U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter HAGUE SERVICE CON-
VENTION] (governing service of summons, complaints and subpoenas between conven-
tion signatories). This treaty provides methods for service of documents between Japan
and the United States. Id. However, the equivalent methods for discovery have been
accepted only by the United States and not Japan. See Obtaining Discovery Abroad, supra
note 3, at 8 (listing Hague Evidence Convention signatories). As of 1990, the signatories
to the Hague Evidence Convention were the United States, Argentina, Barbados, Cy-
prus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel,
Italy, Luxemburg, Mexico, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Id.
126. See Soiret, supra note 124, at 567 (listing and defining methods of discovery
under U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
127. See FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b) (governing notice depositions in other countries).
Rule 28(b) states in relevant part that "depositions may be taken in a foreign country
... on notice before a person authorized to administer oaths in the place where the
examination is held, either by the law thereof or by the law of the United States." Id.
See Soiret, supra note 124, at 567 (explaining notice deposition procedure and use).
Notice depositions are depositions taken in the presence of an individual who is author-
ized to administer oaths in the country of the subject of the deposition. Id. They are
called notice depositions because notice must be given for this type of deposition in the
same way as depositions of U.S. citizens. See FED. R. Crv. P. 30(a) (governing taking of
depositions under oral examination). Rule 30(a) states that
(1) A party may take the testimony of any person, including a party, by deposi-
tion upon oral examination without leave of court except as provided in para-
graph (2) The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by subpoena as pro-
vided in Rule 45.
(2) A party must obtain leave of court, which shall be granted to the extent
consistent with the principles stated in Rule 26(b) (2), if the person to be ex-
amined is confined in prison or if, without written stipulation of the parties
(A) a proposed deposition would result in more than ten depositions be-
ing taken under this rule ... ;
(B) the person to be examined already has been deposed in the case; or
(c ) a party seeks to take a deposition before the time specified in
Rule 26(d)....
Id. See FED. R. Civ. P. 31 (governing depositions upon written questions). Rule 31 pro-
vides that "(1) [a] party may take the testimony of any person, including a party, by
deposition upon written questions without leave of court except as provided in para-
graph (2). The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by the use of subpoena as
provided in Rule 45." Id. Depositions may also be taken in the presence of one author-
ized by the court hearing the case if the non-U.S. court approves of the choice. See
Soiret, supra note 124, at 567 (explaining U.S. deposition procedures under FRCP).
128. See FED. R. Crv. P. 28(b) (governing commission depositions in other coun-
tries). Rule 28(b) states in relevant sections that "depositions may be taken in a foreign
country... before a person commissioned by the court, and a person so commissioned
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ulation, 129 or letters rogatory. 130
The FRCP also allows for a request for production of docu-
ments from a non-U.S. party.131 The breadth of this rule has
created much controversy.1 3 2 Other nations contest that requir-
ing their citizens to produce documents and individuals that ex-
ist outside the United States for inspection in a U.S. court vio-
lates international law. 133 U.S. courts generally hold that these
shall have the power by virtue of the commission to administer any necessary oath and
take testimony." Id. See Soiret, supra note 124, at 568 (explaining commission deposi-
tion procedure and use). Commission depositions are also identical to depositions of
U.S. citizens, but they are held before someone commissioned by the U.S. court. See id.
at 568 (describing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure procedures for depositions by com-
mission). The court must follow any restrictions set by the individual's country, but the
court is free to commission whomever it wants to take the deposition. Id. In Japan,
parties will often use a consular officer, an officer appointed by different nations, for
this purpose. See Sreenan, supra, note 97, at 61 (explaining function and nature of
blocking statutes as designed to prevent U.S. courts from imposing U.S. discovery rules
on citizens of other nations). If used for depositions, a consular officer can also be used
to obtain any documents related to the case that are in the public registry. Id.
129. See Soiret, supra note 124, at 569 (describing stipulation deposition procedure
as having simplest requirements for taking depositions). A stipulation deposition allows
a deposition to occur anywhere, anytime, and before anybody as long as the other party
stipulates that the deposition is acceptable. Id.
130. See id. at 568 (explaining letters rogatory as formal request from U.S. courts to
non-U.S. courts to perform some judicial function). Letters rogatory are complex dis-
covery procedures by which a court requests by formal letters that a non-U.S. court take
the deposition following that court's rules. See id. at 569 (describing letters rogatory
procedure). Even if the non-U.S. country does not require that an individual take an
oath before a deposition, the transcript of the deposition testimony is admissible in U.S.
courts. Id. Letters rogatory are complicated because the Japanese do not have their
own rules for depositions. See Behrens, supra note 79, at 706 (summarizing Japanese
discovery procedures and their effect regarding discouraging litigation). The Japanese
discovery system allows for the taking of voluntary depositions, but not involuntary
ones. Id. See generally Henderson, supra note 23 (showing limitations of Japanese dis-
covery procedures).
131. See FED. R. Civ. P. 34 (making no distinction between U.S. and non-U.S. par-
ties with regard to compliance with requests for document production).
132. SeeJoseph P. Griffin, Beyond Aerospatiale: A Commentary on Foreign Discovery Pro-
visions of the Restatement (Third) and the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, COMMENTARIES ON THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES, ABA Section of International Law and Practice 75, 78 (1992) (ex-
plaining difficulty that terms create regarding balancing of U.S. and Foreign interests).
133. See Soiret, supra note 124, at 569 (noting complaints presented by other na-
tions regarding breadth of U.S. discovery rules). Some nations have enacted blocking
statutes for the specific purpose of preventing U.S. style international discovery. See
Torriente, supra note 9, at 37 (explaining French use of blocking statutes to protect
French citizens from U.S. discovery). Blocking statutes are laws enacted to defeat the
broad nature of U.S. discovery. Id. The French blocking statute, for example, states
that
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requests for documents do not create violations of international
law.' 3 4
U.S. federal courts can issue a subpoena requiring individu-
als who are in other nations to appear before the court to tes-
tify.13, Issuance of subpoenas is allowed when an individual's tes-
timony is necessary in the interests of justice 1  or, in a civil ac-
tion, when no other form of testimony from the person would be
admissible."l 7 Issuance of a subpoena, however, only applies to
U.S. residents or citizens, and U.S. courts have no means to sub-
poena an alien 138 living abroad."3 9
[slubject to treaties or international agreements and applicable laws and regu-
lations, it is prohibited for any party to request, seek or disclose, in writing,
orally or otherwise, economic, commercial, industrial, financial or technical
documents or information leading to the constitution of evidence with a view
to foreign judicial or administrative proceedings or in connection therewith.
See FRENCH PENAL CODE No. 80-538 (criminalizing use of U.S. style pre-trial discovery in
France). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that blocking statutes do not deprive U.S.
courts of the power to order individuals subject to the courts jurisdiction to comply with
an evidence request if it would violate a blocking statute. See Aerospatile, 482 U.S. at
544 n.29 (discussing blocking statute effects on U.S. court jurisdictional power).
134. See Soiret, supra note 124, at 570 (showing U.S. courts consideration of sover-
eignty issues in cases involving non-U.S. parties). U.S. courts have considered the sover-
eignty issues involved, but most have held that the rules do not create a problem. Id.
135. See Walsh Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (1948) (governing subpoena of individuals in
other countries for depositions). Section 1783 (a) provides that
[a] court of the United States may order the issuance of a subpoena requiring
the appearance as a witness before it, or before a person or body designated by
it, of a national or resident of the United States who is in a foreign country, or
requiring the production of a specified document or other thing by him ....
Id.
136. See id. (using "necessary for the interest of justice" to mean situations where
court cannot properly administer laws without issuing subpoena).
137. See id. (explaining Walsh Act requirements for subpoena of non-U.S. parties).
Section 1783 allows non-U.S. party subpoenas when
the court finds that particular testimony or the production of the document or
other thing by him is necessary in the interest of justice, and, in other than a
criminal action or proceeding, if the court finds, in addition, that it is not
possible to obtain his testimony in admissible form without his personal ap-
pearance or to obtain the production of the document or other thing in any
other manner.
Id.
138. See BLACK's LAw DiCTIONARY, supra note 11 at 46 (defining alien as non-na-
tional born person not qualified as citizen of subject nation).
139. See Soiret, supra note 124, at 571 (discussing limitations of federal court
power to subpoena U.S. citizens or aliens residing in United States).
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b. Japanese Pretrial Discovery
The Japanese rules of discovery have mixed origins. 4 ' The
rules are now used in a limited fashion to ensure that relevant
evidence is not lost before trial."' Japanese discovery is gov-
erned by the CCP. 14 2
i. History and Purpose
Japanese civil procedure, including discovery rules, has de-
veloped over Japan's long history.14 Three key developments
shaped Japan's current civil rules.144 TheJapanese civil code was
first influenced by the Chinese legal system.1 45 European law,
especially German law, later influenced the Japanese code. 146
Lastly, the civil code received a heavy U.S. influence after World
140. See Behrens, supra note 79, at 671 (outlining historical origins of Japanese
legal system).
141. See Young, supra note 85, at 899 (explaining limited use of pre-trial discovery
in Japan to ensure that evidence is available for presentation at trial).
142. See CCP, supra note 57, Chp. III, art. 257-351 (governing presentation of evi-
dence and pre-trial discovery for Japanese civil trials).
143. SeeJason F. Cohen, The Japanese Product Liability Law: Sending A Pro-Consumer
Tsunami Through Japan's Corporate and Judicial Worlds, 21 FORDHA1M INT'L L.J. 108, 112
(1997) (analyzing development of Japanese legal system).
144. See Sheinwold, supra note 101, at 275 (describing development of Japanese
legal tradition as paralleling Japanese culture). TheJapanese legal system andJapanese
culture share many similar characteristics. Id. at 277. In both the legal system and the
culture, the Japanese focus on the group as the basic social unit. Id. Japanese society is
also more accepting than U.S. society of individual inequality. Id. In feudal Japan, the
individual had no recourse at law if he or she disagreed with a superior. Id. The
Japanese philosophy' emphasized obedience to superiors and protection of inferiors,
rather than concerns for the self. Id. Japanese acceptance of individual inequality and
of the group as the social unit creates a legal focus on the individual's duties to the
group as opposed to his or her individual rights. Id. This legal focus is one of the
factors, together with procedural limitations, that promotes dispute resolution over liti-
gation in Japan. Id.
145. See Id. at 275 (explaining China's influence on Japanese legal system). Japan
learned from the Chinese the methods of centralizing the emperor's power, reducing
the aristocracy's power, and nationalizing land ownership. Id. These methods were
important to Japanese legal development because they made it possible for Japan to
remain in isolation for five centuries. See id. at 216. During this isolation period, the
Japanese legal system developed without outside influence and developed its unique
character. Id.
146. See Sreenan, supra note 97, at 61 (explaining German influence on Japanese
civil procedure). The Japanese system of taking evidence exclusively at trial is derived
from the German system. Id. The Japanese decided to adopt the German civil code in
1896 in an attempt to modernize their own code. See Shienwold, supra note 101, at 276
(explaining Japan's adoption of German civil code in response to rising importance of
Japanese merchant class). Modernization of the Japanese civil code became necessary
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War 11.47 The majority of pre-trial discovery the CCP allows is
solely for the preservation of evidence.148 Discovery in Japan is
designed to introduce known facts to the judge, not to discover
unknown facts.
149
ii. Current Status and the New CCP
TheJapanese rules of discovery are contained in the CCP.150
There is no Japanese system for written interrogatories.151 Docu-
ment discovery is limited to a party's ability to require the oppo-
nent to produce other documents if the requesting party has a
legal interest in the documents 152 and can identify the docu-
after Commodore Perry landed in Japan in 1853 and ended Japanese isolation in the
late nineteenth century. Id.
147. See Behrens, supra note 79, at 674 (explaining World War II's effects on Japa-
nese legal system). After World War II, during the reconstruction of Japan, the Allies
replaced many of the elements of the Japanese legal system with those of the U.S. legal
system. Id.
148. See Young, supra note 85, at 899 (explaining use of Japanese pre-trial discov-
ery for preserving evidence). Preservation of evidence is a procedure by which a court
can receive discovery outside of the normal evidentiary hearings. Id. Preservation of
evidence is only allowed when a witness is seriously ill or when the property in question
is going to be changed or destroyed. See CCP, supra note 57, art. 343 (providing for the
preservation of evidence in cases of urgency). Article 343 provides that "[t] he court
may, if it considers that there exist such circumstances as making the use of evidence in
question difficult unless examinations thereof is made beforehand, conduct examina-
tion of evidence on motion ...." Id.
149. See Mark F. Wachter, Patent Enforcement in Japan: An American Perspective for
Success, 19 AIPLA Q.J. 59, 76-77 (1991) (explaining methods of evidence preservation in
Japanese patent infringement cases). The pre-trial discovery process is only allowed
when the evidence in question is in imminent danger of being destroyed, such as when
a piece of real property is being renovated or demolished. Id. at 76. If the evidence is
likely to exist at the time of the trial, pre-trial discovery will not be allowed. Id.
150. See Sreenan, supra note 97, at 61 (explaining origin of Japan's Code of Civil
Procedure); see also CCP, supra note 57, (establishingJapanese civil trial rules including
discovery rules). Chapter III of the CCP (articles 257-351) governs rules of evidence.
Id. The CCP is modeled after the German civil code. See Sreenan, supra note 97, at 61
(explaining German civil code influence on CCP's rules for taking evidence at trial).
151. See Nobutoshi Yamanouchi, Understanding the Incidence of Litigation in Japan: A
Structural Analysis, 25 INT'L LAW 433, 447 (1991) (discussing Japanese discovery compli-
cations including lack of interrogatories, requests for admissions, depositions, and doc-
ument requests). The Japanese court does accept any pleading not controverted in
court as being admitted. Id. This non-controverted admission is then treated as evi-
dence for the case. Id.
152. See Ramseyer, supra note 78, at 631 (listing Japanese document production
requirements). There are no procedures to require a non-party individual who will not
be interviewed to disclose documents or information. See Yamonouchi, supra note 151,
at 446 (defining non-party limitation ofJapanese court's power to compel compliance
with discovery). In the United States, however, the court can issue a subpoena requir-
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ments in detail. 53 In Japan, a party cannot refuse production of
a document if the possessing party previously used the docu-
ment,15 4 if the requestor has a contractual right to demand its
production, 55 or if the requestor is a party to the document." 6
These categories for required production of documents cause
many problems due to their vague terms. 157 The court can re-
quire the production of specific documents if it so desires.1 51
Similarly, on site inspections occur only with special authoriza-
tion by a court.'59 Because the required production of docu-
ing a non-party individual to comply with discovery requests. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30
(governing witness subpoena power of U.S. courts)
153. See CCP, supra note 57, art. 313 (defining document request requirements
and restrictions). Article 313 states that "a motion applying production of a document
shall clearly indicate the following matters: (1) Indication of the document; (2) Gist of
the Document; (3) The holder of the document; (4) The fact to be proved; and (5)
The ground of obligation for production of the document." Id.
154. See CCP, supra note 57, art. 312 (1) (creating previously cited document pro-
duction requirement). Article 312 (1) requires an individual to produce a document
where "... the party himself is in possession of the document to which he has referred
to in litigation." Id; see also Naito, supra note 18, at 3 (explaining that CCP Article
312(1) prevents parties from resisting production of documents they have previously
used in presenting their case).
155. See CCP, supra note 57, art. 312(2) (creating entitled document production
requirement). Article 312(2) requires a party to produce a document when "... the
person going to prove is entitled to require the holder of the document the delivery
thereof or to demand the perusal thereof." Id; see Naito, supra note 18, at 3 (explaining
that documents required under CCP Article 312(2) include documents such as ac-
counting documents which requestor is entitled to peruse because he or she is share-
holder of the corporation).
156. See CCP, supra note 57, art. 312(3) (creating benefactor document produc-
tion requirement). Article 312(3) requires an individual to produce a document when:
".... the document has been drawn for the benefit of the person going to prove or for
the legal relations between him and the holder thereof." Id; see also Naito, supra note
18, at 3 (giving contracts as examples of documents protected by CCP Article 312 (3) ).
157. See Yamanouchi, supra note 151, at 446 (explaining that vagueness of catego-
ries has been source of many discovery disputes). The vagueness of the terms exists
because of the Japanese legal system, as a civil law system, does not require judges to
follow previous decisions in interpreting statutes. See Voet, supra note 96, at 98 (ex-
plaining civil law legal systems' statutory interpretation). Some documents can fall into
one of more categories. SeeYamanouchi, supra note 151, at 446 (providing examples of
documents causing confusion under Japanese discovery rules). Medical records, for
example, can fall into either the "benefactor" or the "entitled-to-the-document" excep-
tions. Id.
158. See Sreenan, supra note 97, at 61 (summarizing Japanese discovery and block-
ing statutes). The court can impose fines against an individual who does not comply
with a document production order. Id. These fines are non-penal in nature. Id.
159. See Voet, supra, note 96, at 101 (analyzing limitations of Japanese discovery
regarding inspection of locations and objects). On-site examinations, the process by
which a party can enter the property of another party to examine something for pur-
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ments is limited, corporations assume that nothing will be dis-
covered in a case. 160 In order to assist courts in countries besides
Japan, Japan enacted a law in 1905 that empowered the Japanese
courts to compel oral testimony and written document produc-
tion for non-Japanese cases. 161
MostJapanese discovery is handled at the trial stage. 16 2 Evi-
poses of obtaining evidence, are only authorized in extreme cases and are not common.
Id.; See FED. R. Civ. P. 34 (providing for on-site inspections in U.S. cases).
160. See Naito, supra note 18, at 6 (recognizing exception forJapanese Fair Trade
Commission ('JFrC") cases). The JFTC is the Japanese governmental agency which
enforces antitrust law. SeeJonathan D. Richards, Japan Fair Trade Commission Guidelines
Concerning Distribution Systems and Business Practices: An Illustration of Why Antitrust Law Is
a Weak Solution to U.S. Trade Problems with Japan, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 921, 923 (1993)
(discussing JFTC guidelines and exemptions from normal discovery limitations). The
JFTC can search a place of business and take all documents related to a case with no
exception. See LAw RELATING TO PROHIBITION OF PRIVATE MONOPOLY AND METHODS OF
PRESERVING FAIR TRADE, Law no. 54 of Apr. 14, 1947, art. 46 (establishing Japanese
antitrust law and granting JFTC right to seize documents); see EHS Vol II, KA-KJ, No.
2270-2279 (providing English translation of this law). This right is conditioned in that
[t]he Fair Trade Commission may, in order to conduct necessary investiga-
tions with regard to a case, take such measure as mentioned in the following
each item;
(1) To summon and question persons connected with a case or witness, or
cause them to submit their view or report
(2) To summon experts and cause them to give expert testimony
(3) To order persons holding accounting books, documents, and other mat-
ters to submit the same, and retain such submitted matters;
(4) To enter any place of business, or other necessary places of the persons
connected with a case and examine conditions of business operation, account-
ing books, and other matters
Id. Only documents held at a bengoshi's office are immune to this search. See BENGOSHI
Ho, supra note 51 art. 23 (listing bengoshi privilege protecting documents from JFTC
seizures).
161. See AcT RELATING TO THE RECIPROCALJUDICIAL ASSISTANCE TO BE GIVEN AT THE
REQUEST OF FOREIGN COURTS, Law No. 63 of Mar. 13, 1905 (Japan) [hereinafter JUDI-
CIAL ASSISTANCE AT] (requiring Japanese courts to assist non-Japanese courts by com-
pelling testimony or document protection when assistance is necessary and appropri-
ate); see Obtaining Discovery Abroad, supra note 3, at 140 (providing English translation).
The Judicial Assistance Act requires that "[a] [Japanese] court shall, at the request of a
foreign court, render judicial assistance in serving documents or taking evidence in
connection with cases on civil or criminal matters." Id; see also Sreenan, supra note 97,
at 61 (focusing on documents necessary to resolution of non-Japanese case).
162. See Sreenan, supra note 97, at 61 (explaining Japanese evidence presentation
as involving examination by judges of witnesses and documents). Evidence and argu-
ments are not presented in a consecutive fashion in Japanese courts, but are introduced
in short hearings which are scheduled separately. See Kato, supra note 19, at 632
(describing Japanese system by which one party presents evidence and arguments at
one hearing and other party responds to arguments and presents counter evidence at
another hearing until all evidence has been presented). Often more than twenty hear-
ings are needed before all of the parties finish introducing all the evidence. Id. Eviden-
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dence is presented to the judge at evidentiary hearings.'63 The
Japanese court can examine any witness it desires during the
trial. "'6 4 Witnesses, however, are rarely used in trials and most
evidence is submitted in documents. 6 Non-disclosure privileges
are also set forth in the CCP.' 6 6
tiary hearings in Japan are often scheduled months apart from each other. See Miller,
supra note 52, at 34 (explaining that one judge rarely presides over all evidentiary hear-
ings of one case, leading to further delays until judgment is rendered).
163. See Wachter, supra note 149, at 77 (explaining Japanese trial discovery as be-
ing comprised mostly of signed written statements presented to judges, although the
court may allow oral testimony). Japanese procedural law states that evidentiary hear-
ings are supposed to occur in concentrated or continuous evidentiary hearings. See
Takeshi Kojima, Civil Procedure Reform In Japan, 11 MICH. J. INT'L. LAw 1218, 1227
(1990) (analyzing strengths and weaknesses of Japanese civil procedure). These hear-
ings are supposed to be held over the shortest time possible until all the evidence is
presented. Id. In practice, however, the hearings are spread over time, usually approxi-
mately one every seventy five days. Id. Lawyers play little or no role in the Japanese
evidentiary proceeding, which is handled by the judge. See Mori, supra note 102, at 4
(explaining that in Japan judges direct all disclosure and production requests).
164. See CCP, supra note 57, art. 271 (granting Japanese courts power to examine
witnesses). Except as otherwise provided, the court may examine any person as a wit-
ness. Id. Article 272 governs the examining of government officials and states "in the
event that the court is to examine a government official or a person who was a govern-
ment official as witness regarding official secrets, it shall obtain approval from the com-
petent supervising government agency." Id. Article 273 governs examination of minis-
ters of state and provides "in the event that the court is to examine the Prime Minister
or ministers of state or persons who once occupied such office as witness regarding
official secrets, it shall obtain approval from the Cabinet." Id. Article 274 governs the
examination of a member of the Diet and states "in the event that the court is to ex-
amine a member of the House of Representatives or the House of Councillors or a
person who was such member as witness regarding official secrets, it shall obtain ap-
proval from the respective House." Id.
The court can impose penalties if the witness does not appear in court. See CCP
supra note 57, art. 277 (granting courts power to penalize non-appearing witnesses).
Article 277 states that "the court may, in case a witness did not appear withoutjustifiable
causes, order him, by ruling, to bear the court costs incurred thereby and further im-
pose upon him a non-penal fine not exceeding a hundred thousand yen." Id.
165. SeeJames A. Forstner, Patent Litigation in Japan, China and Korea, 366 PLI/PAT
13, 16 (1993) (explaining that actual Japanese trial procedure occurs more slowly than
provided for in CCP). Most Japanese judges consider witnesses to be time consuming
and not worth delaying the trial. Id. Only court appointed expert witnesses are nor-
mally allowed to testify. Id. An expert witness is defined as "[a]ny person of learning
and/or experience necessary to give an expert testimony... ." See CCP, supra note 57,
art. 302 (providing for obligation of one defined by Japanese court as court expert to
give expert testimony).
166. See Shienwold, supra note 101, at 278 (focusing on importance of protecting
industry secrets from disclosure in Japan). The CCP provides that a witness may refuse
to testify "[i]n case he is questioned with respect to matters relating to a technical or
professional secret." See CCP, supra note 57, art. 281 (providing grounds under which
witnesses may refuse to testify without incurring fines or imprisonment).
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As of January 1998, the New CCP 16 7 came into effect in Ja-
pan.168 The New CCP requires individuals to produce all docu-
ments relevant to a case unless the document would criminally
incriminate the holder,169 contains information the holder re-
ceived in the line of duty as a professional,17 ° or is for the
holder's benefit.
17 1
II. APPLICATION OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE TO
JAPANESE QUASI-LAWYERS IN U.S. COURTS
The application of the attorney-client privilege to non-U.S.
non-bar members presents many issues. 172 U.S. courts have two
published decisions which address this issue. 173 The question
arises more frequently, however, in commentary and there are
many arguments presented about why courts should or should
not apply the attorney-client privilege.17 1
A. Case Law Relevant to Non-U.S. Quasi-Lawyers
Only two cases have included a discussion of the application
167. See generally NEW CCP, supra note 61 (revising and governing procedures by
which civil trials are run in Japan).
168. See Naito, supra note 18, at 4 (explaining that New CCP provides for broader
use of document production in Japanese civil proceedings).
169. See NEW CCP, supra note 61, art. 220 (creating personal incrimination privi-
lege). The new CCP states that production is excused if "[t]he document contains
information which may cause criminal prosecution upon the party or his family." Id.
170. See NEW CCP, supra note 61, art. 220 (defining personal use discovery excep-
tion). The New CCP states that production of a document is excused if "[t]he docu-
ment includes description of facts that he, being or having been an attorney, patent
attorney, notary, doctor, dentist, and so forth, has obtained in the exercise of profes-
sional duties and which facts should remain confidential (including technical or profes-
sional secrets)" Id. This provision reaffirms the theory that the protection of profes-
sional and industry secrets are important to the Japanese. See Shienwold, supra note
101, at 278 (discussing Japanese use of discovery privileges to protect industry).
171. See NEW CCP, supra note 61, art. 220 (providing exception to required discov-
ery for documents for personal use). The New CCP states that production is excused if
"[t]he document is primarily used for the benefit of the holder." Id.
172. See Yoshida, supra note 4 (analyzing many issues arising when considering
application of attorney-client privilege to non-bar quasi-lawyers from various non-U.S.
countries).
173. See Renfield Corp. v. E. Remy Martin & Co., 98 F.R.D. 442 (Del. 1982) (dis-
cussing French in-house legal personnel who are not members of French Bar); see also
Honeywell v. Minolta, 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis 5954 (N.J. 1990) (discussing Japanese in-
house legal personnel).
174. See Hill, supra note 17, at 182 (discussing issues involved in application of
attorney-client privilege to in-house and non-bar legal personnel).
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of the attorney-client privilege to non-bar, in-house personnel in
their published decision.' 75 One of these cases, Renfield Corp. v.
E. Remy Martin & Co.,' 76 held in favor of applying the attorney-
client privilege to non-bar in-house legal personnel. 177 In the
other case, Honeywell v. Minolta, 178 the court disagreed with the
Remy Martin holding, and determined that the privilege does not
apply to non-bar individuals. 171
1. The Remy-Martin Decision
Remy Martin is the case most supportive of the application of
the attorney-client privilege to non-bar in-house attorneys. 180
The issue in Remy Martin, arose in the context of an antitrust
case against a French corporation.' The U.S. District Court ex-
amined the French legal system, and concluded that France had
no equivalent to the U.S. bar.8 2 The court did find that France
had a two-tiered system of avocatsl83 who argue before the courts
and conseils juridiques' 4 who only tender legal advice.' 85 These
175. See Remy Martin, 98 F.R.D. at 445 (applying the attorney-client privilege to
French in-house legal personnel based on their functional equivalence to U.S. lawyers);
but see Minolta, 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis 5954 at *9 (denying the privilege to Japanese in-
house legal personnel because they were not de facto attorneys).
176. 98 F.R.D. 442 (Del. 1982)
177. See Remy Martin, 98 F.R.D. at 446 (examining if French in-house legal person-
nel are lawyers for purposes of attorney-client privilege application).
178. 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis 5954 (N.J. 1990)
179. See Minolta, 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis, at *8 (examining whether Japanese in-
house legal personnel are lawyers for purposes of attorney-client privilege application).
180. See Remy Martin, 98 F.R.D. at 444 (applying protection of attorney-client privi-
lege to documents produced by French in-house legal personnel).
181. See id. (determining attorney-client privilege applicability with international
parties). Specifically, a U.S. company and its subsidiary brought an antitrust suit against
the French company E. Remy Martin which had offices both in the United States and
France. Id. at 442. The corporation claimed the attorney-client privilege to resist the
production of many documents prepared by their in-house legal personnel. Id. The
court recognized that the documents confidential intent, so the issue became whether
the privilege applied to French in-house legal personnel. Id. The plaintiff contested
this privilege on the basis that the in-house legal personnel were not members of a bar.
Id.
182. See Black, supra note 14, at 160 (discussing Remy Martin court's comparison of
U.S. and French legal systems' organization). In France, three types of legal profession-
als perform different functions that would all be handled by lawyers in the United
States. Id.
183. See Remy Martin, 98 F.R.D. at 444 (concluding that avocats are French individ-
uals who provide legal advice and can argue before French court, but may not be em-
ployed by any person or organization).
184. See id. (determining that conseils juridiques are French individuals who are a]-
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two forms of attorneys are on an official list of practicing French
attorneys."8 6 The French government forbids in-house legal per-
sonnel from being on this list."87
The Remy Martin court recognized that because the in-house
counsel could not be on this list, 18 their membership to a bar
would not be the relevant criterion for determining the applica-
tion of the attorney-client privilege. 9 The court, instead, used
a functional criterion for this purpose.19 ° The court felt that the
relevant question was whether the individual was competent to
render legal advice and was permitted by law to do so.' 91 To be
eligible for the attorney-client privilege protection, an individual
must generally perform similar functions to U.S. lawyers.1 92 The
French in-house legal personnel have legal training, 93 are em-
ployed to give legal advice,1 94 with permission to do so as deter-
mined under French law.1 95 The French in-house personnel
also perform many of the same functions as U.S. lawyers.19 6 Be-
lowed to provide legal advice and may be employed by other conseilsjuridiques, but who
are not allowed to argue before courts).
185. See id. (comparing U.S. attorneys to French legal personnel). U.S. attorneys
do the work of both avocats and conseilsjuridiques as well as the work performed by the
French in-house legal personnel. Id.
186. See Fujita, supra note 90 (explaining that Remy Martin court held that French
list of avocats and conseils jurisdiques is not equivalent of U.S. bar).
187. See Remy-Martin, 98 F.R.D. at 444 (recognizing right of French in-house legal
personnel to provide legal advice to corporations which employ them).
188. See Fujita, supra note 90 (explaining plaintiff's argument that removal from
French list meant that French in-house legal personnel could not be members of
French bar). Id.
189. See Remy-Martin, 98 F;R.D. at 444 (analyzing criterion for privilege application
as expectation that communications would be confidential and that lawyers or their
functional equivalent are parties to this conversation).
190. See id. (creating test based on function of an individual, or functional equiva-
lence test, for application of attorney-client privilege).
191. See id. (defining necessary requirements for privilege application as being
legal education combined with purpose of employment being for individual to provide
legal advice and perform functions similar to U.S. attorneys).
192. See Black, supra note 14, at 161 (explaining that French in-house lawyers per-
form similar functions to U.S. in-house lawyers by giving legal advice on matters signifi-
cant to corporation). The Remy-Martin court does not define which functions need to
be similar for application of the attorney-client privilege. Id.
193. See Fujita, supra note 90 (discussing the Remy Martin court's acceptance of
sufficiency of education of E. Remy Martin's legal personnel).
194. See Black, supra note 14, at 160 (recognizing E. Remy Martin's in-house legal
personnel were employed to give legal advice).
195. See Fujita, supra note 90 (noting French law does not prohibit French in-
house legal personnel from giving legal advice).
196. See Yoshida, supra note 4, at 243 (showing Remy Martin court applied attor-
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cause these factors were met, the court applied the attorney-cli-
ent privilege. 197 Courts and scholars refer to this test as the func-
tional equivalence test.'9 8 The Remy-Martin court also stressed
the importance of the intention and reasonable expectation of
the document's holder that the documents in question would
remain confidential. 199
2. The Minolta Decision
One court rejected the application of the functional equiva-
lence test to Japanese in-house lawyers.2 °° In Honeywell v. Mi-
nolta,2° ' the U.S. District Court did not accept the functional
equivalence test,20 2 and stated that it would only apply the attor-
ney-client privilege if the employee was a defacto20 3 attorney.204
The court began its analysis by noting that the employee never
ney-client privilege because of substantive legal advisory work). See also Fujita, supra
note 90 (discussing Remy Martin court's analysis of French in-house legal personnel
work).
197. See Remy Martin, 98 F.R.D. at 444 (holding lack of U.S. bar membership not
determinative for applicability of attorney-client privilege). Renfield argued that
French lawyers could not be experts on U.S. law, and thereby should be denied the
attorney-client privilege. Id. at n.6. The court refused to accept Remy Martin's argu-
ment. Id. at 444. The court held that "[w]hile the fact that a lawyer is not a member of
the bar of a United States jurisdiction may be relevant in determining whether a com-
munication is for the purposes of securing legal advice, it is not necessarily determina-
tive of that issue." Id.
198. See Minolta, 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis 5954 at *6 (explaining and analyzing Remy
Martin holding).
199. See Remy Martin, 98 F.R.D. at 444 (holding that parties' expectation of confi-
dentiality of information is most important criterion for application of attorney-client
privilege).
200. See Minolta, 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis 5954 at *7 (finding that functional equiva-
lence test is not generally accepted in U.S. Court of Appeals for Third Circuit).
201. See id. (questioning attorney-client privilege applicability to Japanese in-house
legal personnel). The Minolta decision was in a case on appeal from a district court
order denying Honeywell's request to take the deposition of one of Minolta's in-house
legal personnel. Id. While Minolta did not dispute that the employee did not belong to
the bar, Minolta argued that the employee was the functional equivalent of a U.S. law-
yer under the functional equivalence test from Remy Martin. Id.
202. See id. (explaining court's reluctance to apply test). The Third Circuit had
never applied the functional equivalence test as a general proposition. Id.
203. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 11, at 287 (defining de facto as the
state of affairs which must be accepted for all practical purposes, so that defacto attor-
neys would be individuals who though not legally attorneys, are such for all practical
purposes).
204. See Minolta, 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis 5954 at *7 (limiting attorney-client privilege
application to specific language used in standard wording of statute).
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received a license to practice law in any country.2 °5 The court
then looked at the employee's education, ' 6 and determined
that it was insufficient to find him a de facto attorney.207 The
court concluded by stating that the presence of licensed bengoshi
conflicts with the idea of considering a non-licensed individual a
de facto attorney.2 °8
B. Commentary
While there are only two published cases regarding applica-
tion of the attorney-client privilege to non-bar non-U.S. in-house
legal personnel,20 9 the application of the privilege has been the
subject of much discussion.210 Many scholars and judges have
written about this issue. 21' The scholars have supported both
sides of the issue.21 2
1. For the privilege
Scholars argue that there are three major reasons that U.S.
courts should apply the attorney-client privilege to Japanese in-
house counsel.213 The most common arguments that these
205. See Black, supra note 14, at 162 (discussing Minolta court's focus on lack of bar
membership in denying attorney-client privilege to in-house legal personnel).
206. See Minolta, 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis 5954 at *9 (finding employee's education
consisted of Bachelor's of Science and attendance at lectures and seminars on law).
207. See id. (holding Minolta's in-house legal personnel were not defacto attorneys
for purposes of applying attorney-client privilege).
208. See id. at *7 (limiting use of functional equivalence test to individuals from
non-bar countries).
209. See Remy Martin, 98 F.R.D. at 442 (considering application of attorney-client
privilege to non-bar in-house legal personnel); but see Minolta, 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis at
5954 (discussing criterion for application of attorney-client privilege).
210. See Hill, supra note 17, at 182 (presenting various arguments for and against
application of attorney-client privilege to European, non-bar, in-house legal personnel
in U.S. courts).
211. See Fujita, supra note 90 (arguing for application of attorney-client privilege to
Japanese in-house legal personnel); Fox, supra note 4, (disfavoring application of privi-
lege to Japanese legal personnel); Rosenberg, supra note 109 (arguing that attorney-
client privilege must be applied equally to all legal personnel); Chen, supra note 74
(explaining reasons application of attorney-client privilege would be appropriate);
Kato, supra note 19 (discussing qualification of Japanese legal personal for attorney-
client privlege protection); Yoshida, supra note 4 (discussing application of attorney-
client privlege to in-house legal personnel).
212. See Yoshida, supra note 4, at 220-24, 247 (arguing for application of attorney-
client privilege to Japanese quasi-lawyers). But see Miller, supra note 52, at 37 (propos-
ing that Japanese quasi-lawyers are not equivalent to U.S. lawyers).
213. See Fujita, supra note 90 (listing arguments supporting attorney-client privi-
lege applicability to Japanese in-house legal personnel).
1592 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 21:1558
scholars pose are questions of fairness concerned with unequal
application of the attorney-client privilege.214 Other scholars see
the issue differently and argue for the privilege to be applied
because of the roles of bengoshi and quasi-lawyers in the Japanese
legal system.2 15 Still other scholars argue that the attorney-client
privilege should be applied to the Japanese in-house legal per-
sonnel as subordinates of U.S. attorneys who assist the U.S. attor-
neys on matters involving U.S. law and the United States.216
a. Arguments About Fairness
The most common fairness argument is that Japanese liti-
gants should have no less protection from discovery simply be-
cause their legal system is different. 217 Those supporting this ar-
gument state that Japanese litigants should have access to the
same privileges and defenses as U.S. litigants. 218 If a U.S. party
invokes the attorney-client privilege, the U.S. party should be es-
topped219 from denying the opponent the protection of the priv-
ilege. 22° The court must be fair and cannot only protect one
side of a legal dispute.22
In an article based on fairness, one scholar presented many
other fairness arguments. 222 This scholar contends that because
the non-bengoshi legal personnel have undergraduate law de-
grees and perform the same work as U.S. lawyers, 23 they should
214. See Fox, supra note 4, at 19 (illustrating need for fair treatment of Japanese
parties in U.S. litigations).
215. See Miller, supra note 52, at 28-31 (explaining that quasi-lawyers perform same
functions as U.S. attorneys).
216. MECA/Customs Investigation Documents for Presentation to U.S. Attorney
on June 10, 1991 [hereinafter MECA] (arguing attorney-client privilege expansion for
Japanese in-house counsel working with U.S. lawyers).
217. See Miller, supra note 52, at 38 (supporting Japanese litigants access to U.S.
discovery privileges)
218. See Fujita, supra note 90 (arguing for equal application of attorney-client privi-
lege to all parties).
219. See BLACK'S LAw DicrIONARv, supra note 11, at 382 (defining "estopping some-
thing" as precluding it from occurring).
220. See Fox, supra note 4, at 21 (arguing that attorney-client privilege must be
applied equitably when both parties claim its protection).
221. See Rosenberg, supra note 109, at 2200-01 (noting that courts must question if
procedural rules are applied fairly and equally to similarly situated persons).
222. See Fujita, supra note 90 (questioning in-house counsel's ability to be profes-
sional or independent when rendering legal advice). The scholar wonders if the attor-
ney-client privilege should ever be applied to in-house personnel, regardless of whether
such individuals are members of the bar. Id.
223. See id. (explaining non-bengoshi education and function).
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receive the attorney-client privilege.22 4 The privilege is applied
to U.S. in-house lawyers only when they are performing legal
functions. 225 Because the non-bengoshi legal personnel are usu-
ally performing legal functions exclusively, 226 the scholar claims
that application of the attorney-client privilege is appropriate.227
These non-bengoshi perform legal functions because of the lim-
ited number of individuals allowed into the LTRI each year.
228
The scholar states that if it were possible for more individuals to
be bengoshi, then the bengoshi would instead perform the legal
functions. 229  These non-bengoshi who studied law as undergrad-
uates are more likely to specialize in the area of law questioned
in the litigation. 23" The qualifications of the non-bengoshi indi-
viduals are also supported by the fact that many legal texts and
materials are available outside of law school in Japan.2 3 1  These
books are written by non-bengoshi experts, who also teach a ma-
jority of the LTRI courses.2 3 2 In this article, the commentator
also reiterates the importance of the lack of pre-trial discovery
for internal documents in Japan. 23  This scholar recognizes that
the expectation of confidentiality is extremely important to the
application of the privilege, 234 and claims that the expectation
224. See id. (describing similarities between U.S. attorneys and Japanese bengoshi).
225. See Black, supra note 14, at 105 (discussing cases finding performance of legal
function is the most important criterion). Courts have refused to apply the attorney-
client privilege when no evidence was presented as to the capacity of the individual at
the time of the communication. Id. See also Gulf & Western, 518 F.Supp. at 683 (deny-
ing privilege application without evidence as to status of individual as legal advisor).
226. See Fujita, supra note 90 (explaining that in-house non-bengoshi specialize in
legal matters for their corporation). The communications and advice prepared by the
non-bengoshi are treated as highly confidential by the corporation. Id.
227. See id. (determining non-bengoshi meet attorney-client privilege criterion).
228. See Chen, supra note 74, at 8-9 (explaining and analyzing LTRI application
and acceptance rates). In 1984 the LTRI admitted 453 students, only 1.9% of over
23,000 applicants. Id.
229. See Fujita, supra note 90 (explaining reasons for the functions of non-
bengoshi).
230. See id. (describing Japanese legal area specialization methods). The individu-
als will take courses and attend lectures which will prepare them for specific tasks their
corporation will need. Id.
231. See id. (comparing law book sales between United States and Japan). Ten
percent of books sold in Japan are legal books while in the United States few legal
books are sold to the general population. Id.
232. See id. (describing non-bengoshi authored law books). Most LTRI students
studied using text books authored by non-bengoshi. Id.
233. See id. (explaining limited discovery's effect on expectation of attorney-client
privilege).
234. See Upjohn v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 383 (1981) (holding attorney-client privi-
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that nothing will be discovered in Japan should be sufficient to
meet the confidentiality expectation. 235 The legal author does
not, however, believe that the attorney-client privilege is without
limits, and would apply it only to high ranking legal person-
nel.
2 3 6
b. Arguments Relating to Bengoshi Function
Scholars pose other arguments supporting the application
of the attorney-client privilege to quasi-lawyers in Japan.237
These scholars, in asserting these arguments are concerned with
the distinct roles of bengoshi and quasi lawyers in Japan, extended
the privilege to the non-bengoshi in-house personnel because it is
rare for bengoshi to work in-house.23' Bengoshi do not normally
work in-house because they must obtain permission from the
Japanese bar to work full-time for a company.239 Others claimed
that admission to the bar is not the most important criterion for
lege applies when communications with corporate attorneys were not disclosed to any
other individuals); see also Sandtrade, Ltd. v. General Electric Co., 150 F.R.D. 539
(E.D.N.C. 1993) (holding that documents receive protection of the attorney-client privi-
lege when shared only with those who need to know information contained within doc-
uments); see alsoJonathan Corp. v. Prime Computer, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 693, 697 (E.D. Va.
1987) (holding that communications must be made under circumstances from which
individuals may reasonably assume information will remain in confidence).
235. See Fujita, supra note 90 (describing difficulties obtaining documents in Japa-
nese law suit).
236. See id. (endorsing limitation of attorney-client privilege protection to Bucho,
ficho, or Kacho). Bucho, Jicho, and Kacho are the equivalents of managers, assistant man-
agers, and department heads respectively. Id.
237. See id. (explaining roles of quasi lawyers and bengoshi in light of requirements
for application of attorney-client privilege).
238. See id. (analyzing bengoshi employment positions in Japanese corporations).
In 1992, only 17 bengoshi were employed as in-house legal personnel. Id. at 5. Individu-
als working in-house have better access to information regarding the client and more
power regarding decisions made by the corporation, putting them in a better position
to promote corporate compliance with the law. See Hill, supra note 17, at 187 (explain-
ing advantages in-house legal personnel have over independant counsel regarding in-
flusense over corporate officers).
239. See Hill, supra note 17, 187 (explaining statutory bengoshi employment limita-
tions). A bengoshi must get permission from his local bar association in order to work
in-house. See BENGOSHI Ho, supra note 51, art. 30 (3) (barring bengoshi from running
profit making businesses or from being employed by such businesses). Article 30 (3) of
the Bengoshi Ho provides that "[a) lawyer shall be barred, unless he obtains the permis-
sion from the bar association to which he belongs, from running any profit-making
business, or becoming an employee of the operator of such a business, or an executive
member of any profit-making juristic person, or director or employee thereof." Id.
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application of the attorney-client privilege.24 ° If bar admission
was not the most important criterion for application of the privi-
lege it could be extended to non-bar individuals whenever the
other requirements of the attorney-client privilege are met.2 4 1
While not discussed in the context of non-U.S. attorneys, a simi-
lar question has been analyzed by courts in the context of apply-
ing the attorney-client privilege to U.S. lawyers not admitted to
the local bar.242 Some U.S. courts consider the question of local
bar admission to be completely immaterial.2 4  After reviewing
244the public policy on the issue, one court determined that it is
not desirable to require attorneys to pass the bar for every loca-
tion where the attorneys wish to practice. 45 This court consid-
ers the legal function part of the analysis to be the most impor-
tant.24 6 Supporters of this approach state that there are advan-
tages to using a functional equivalence approach.247 The
supporters claim that the functional equivalence test is applied
240. See Kandel, supra note 27, at 522 (explaining relative unimportance of lack of
bar membership to application of attorney-client privilege). One court has stated that
"[a] dmission to the bar is, in my mind, immaterial to the obligations of house counsel.
The issue, I believe, is whether one is acting as an attorney and receiving confidential
communications...." See International Business Machines Corp. v. Murray, 2 Ct. LR 6
(Stamford Super. July 30, 1990) (holding that attorney-client privilege protected com-
munications prepared by in-house counsel not member of the local bar).
241. See Kandel, supra note 27, at 517 (analyzing limiting effect of attorney-client
privilege on employment litigation frequency). The other criterion which would be
considered would be whether the communication was made for securing legal advice
and without the presence of strangers. Id.
242. See id. (recognizing potential expansion of applicability of attorney-client priv-
ilege IBM decision creates for anyone acting in capacity of legal advisor).
243. See Georgia-Pacific Plywood Co. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 18 F.R.D. 463,
(S.D.N.Y. 1956) (holding that U.S. lawyer who was working as in-house corporate coun-
sel, but was not admitted to local bar of state of corporation, still qualified for attorney-
client privilege).
244. Id. (explaining that decision of whether to apply attorney-client privilege to
attorneys who were not members of bar raised issues regarding desirability of having
attorneys take bar exams of all states in which they have clients). The court recognized
that denying the attorney-client privilege would create an incentive for in-house person-
nel to acquire local licenses. Id. at 465.
245. See id. (determining that policies favoring application of attorney-client privi-
lege outweighed advantages of requiring local bar membership from in-house counsel).
246. See Black, supra note 14, at 160 (explaining Georgia-Pacific decision). The
Georgia-Pacific court's analysis supports the functional equivalence test of the Remy Mar-
tin court. See Remy Martin, 98 F.R.D. at 444 (holding that individual must be functional
equivalent of U.S. attorney for attorney-client privilege application).
247. See Yoshida, supra note 4, at 243 (explaining the advantages of applying Remy-
Martin court's functional equivalence test as focusing on nature of communications
without removing traditional requirement of expectation of confidentiality).
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more predictably, allowing corporations to predict which docu-
ments will be protected.248 The functional equivalence test
places importance on the nature of the communication that the
protection is sought for,249 allowing individuals with comparable
educational backgrounds and who perform functions equivalent
to that of U.S. lawyers to receive the protection of the privi-
lege.250
Other scholars focus on the work bengoshi do not per-
form.2 51 They claim that if courts apply the privilege to bengoshi
exclusively, the courts will be granting protection to very few
legal documents in Japan.252 The in-house, legal personnel pro-
vide corporations with the necessary legal advice for business
transactions involving the United States.253 The in-house per-
sonnel are also involved with drafting contracts, serving in the
same capacity as U.S. lawyers.25 4 The application of the attorney-
client privilege to U.S. in-house lawyers encourages corporations
to obtain legal advice and better compliance with the law by
their corporations.255 Scholars contend that if the privilege is
not applied to Japanese in-house legal personnel, Japanese cor-
porations will be less inclined to seek legal advice and therefore
be less able to comply with U.S. law.2 56
c. Arguments Concerning U.S. Subordinates
One argument for the application of the attorney-client
248. See id. (discussing corporate benefits from ability to predict when court will
apply attorney-client privilege).
249. See id. at 244 (explaining functional equivalence test analysis of communica-
tions' nature as concerning legal advice).
250. See Remy Martin, 98 F.R.D. at 444 (extending attorney-client privilege applica-
tion to equivalent non-bar non-U.S. personnel).
251. See Kato, supra note 19, at 651 (explaining importance of quasi-lawyers' roles
regarding performance of many functions which lawyers perform in United States).
252. See Fujita, supra note 90 (examining limited documents receiving attorney-
client privilege if courts do not grant quasi-lawyers privilege).
253. See MECA, supra note 216, at tab 12 (describing function of Matsushida Elec-
tric International's in-house legal personnel).
254. See Kato, supra note 19, at 651 (explaining functions not performed by
bengoshi). It is rare for bengoshi to draft contracts or other legal documents. Id. This
work is left to the quasi lawyers and in-house legal personnel. Id.
255. See Basri, supra note 33, at 48 (emphasizing need for corporate communica-
tions with in-house counsel to be protected if corporations are to comply with U.S. law).
256. See Hill, supra note 17, at 186 (explaining effects of European Union denial
of attorney-client privilege to in-house legal personnel on ability to become participants
in world markets).
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privilege states that any interaction between Japanese in-house
legal personnel and U.S. lawyers, whether independent counsel
or in-house counsel at the corporations' U.S. subsidiary, the priv-
ilege should extend to the in-house legal personnel.2 57 U.S.
courts have recognized this extension of the privilege for clerks
and secretaries, 25 8 U.S. and non-U.S. patent agents, 259 and other
non-lawyers working as agents of U.S. lawyers. 26 ° The attorney-
client privilege applies if the non-lawyer is acting as a translator
or intermediate for U.S. lawyers.261
2. Arguments Against the Privilege
Those who argue against applying the attorney-client privi-
lege to non-bar in-house legal personnel consider different as-
pects of the issue.262 These arguments are often concerned with
a strict interpretation of the requirement that the communica-
tion be with a member of the bar.263 Other arguments address
257. See Black, supra note 14, at 163 (explaining attorney-client privilege extension
to U.S. attorney subordinates, including secretaries and paralegals). Extending the at-
torney-client privilege to Japanese in-house legal personnel is not unreasonable, as
much of the work they do in connection to the United States involves working with U.S.
attorneys. See MECA, supra note 216, at tab 12 (explaining subsidiary functions of Japa-
nese in-house legal personnel working for U.S. attorneys).
258. See U.S. v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2nd Cir. 1961) (recognizing that assist-
ance of secretaries, file clerks, operators, and other agents is indispensable to ability of
lawyers to perform legal services properly); See also Sandtrade, Ltd. v. General Elec.
Co., 150 F.R.D. 593 (1993) (extending attorney-client privilege to non-lawyers assisting
the U:S. lawyer in gathering and distributing requested legal advice); see also United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F.Supp 357, 360 (D. Mass. 1950) (extending protection of attor-
ney-client privilege to documents prepared by clerks of corporation's general counsel).
259. See Burroughs Welcome Co v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 611, 617
(E.D.N.C. 1992) (applying attorney-client privilege to non-U.S. patent agents not be-
longing to bar).
260. SeeYoshida, supra note 4, at 216 n.46 (listing examples of non lawyer's receiv-
ing protection of attorney-client privilege as agents, interpreters, or intermediaries of
U.S. lawyers). See Virginia J. Harnisch, Confidential Communications Between Clients and
Patent Agents: Are They Protected Under the Attorney-Client Privilege? 16 HASTINGS COMM.
ETr. L. J. 433, 434 (1994) (examining U.S. court extention of attorney-client privilege
protection to representative of U.S. lawyers).
261. See Burroughs Welcome, 143 F.R.D. at 617 (holding that if non-U.S. non-lawyer
is serving as lawyer's functionary, communications are privileged); see also MECA, supra
note 216, at tab 12 (presenting arguments for attorney-client privilege application to
Japanese in-house legal personnel).
262. See Yoshida, supra note 4 (examining arguments against applying attorney-
client privilege to any non-U.S., non-bar, legal personnel).
263. See Feagan, supra note 22, at 760 (explaining need to strictly construe attor-
ney-client privilege because of its implicit supression of searches for truth).
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the concern that because there are no equivalent privileges in
Japan, Japanese corporate communications cannot meet the ex-
pectation of confidentiality requirement of the attorney-client
privilege. 264 When considering functional equivalence as a rea-
son for applying the attorney-client privilege, some scholars as-
sert that quasi-lawyers do not have an education equivalent to
that of U.S. lawyers.265 Finally, some scholars discuss the theory
that in-house legal personnel cannot give corporations profes-
sional, legal counseling due to their lack of independence.266
a. Strict Language Interpretation
One reason for denying the attorney-client privilege is
found in the wording of the privilege itself.26 7 The language of
the attorney-client privilege states that the privilege is only appli-
cable to a communication with one who is a member of a bar of
a court.268 Arguments concerned with language believe that
courts must strictly interpret the privilege must be strictly inter-
preted to prevent creation of a zone of silence.269 Proponents of
the strict interpretation arguments consider that strict interpre-
tation of the language is important because the attorney-client
privilege frustrates the search for truth.27 Some U.S. cases hold
that lack of local bar membership is a sign that an individual is
not acting as an attorney.27' If U.S. bar members are denied the
264. See Hill, supra note 17, at 193 (arguing, in context of European nations; that
non-bar in-house counsel who are not subject to bar-related disciplinary actions for vio-
lating confidences of clients should not receive protection of attorney-client privilege).
265. See Kato, supra note 19 (describing Japanese quasi-lawyer legal education and
comparing this education to that of, U.S. lawyers).
266. See Fujita, supra note 90 (questioning in-house legal personnel's ability to
counsel corporate clients professionally).
267. See Gulf& Western, 518 F. Supp. at 682 (holding need for strict interpretation
of attorney-client privilege wording).
268. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 358 (providing standard accepted wording of attorney-
client privilege).
269. See Gulf & Western, 518 F. Supp. at 682 (finding blanket application of privi-
lege for corporations unacceptable); See also The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Corporate
Client: Where Do We Go After Upjohn?, 81 MICH. L.REv. 665, 668 (1983) (fearing possibility
of protecting all corporate communications). A zone of silence is created by giving in
house councel all documents so the attorney-client privilege on all documents. Id; see
also Hill, supra note 17, at 180 (explaining zone of silence as universal protection of
corporate documents which over application of attorney-client privelege could create).
270. See Burroughs Welcome, 143 F.R.D. at 615 (explaining need for strict interpreta-
tion of attorney-client privilege language for proper application).
271. See Black, supra note 14, at 161 (discussing cases denying privilege to non-
local bar U.S. in-house lawyers); see also American Cynamid Co. v; Hercules Powder Co.,
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protection of the attorney-client privilege based on their lack of
membership to the local bar, some scholars maintain the privi-
lege should not be extended to non-U.S. individuals who are not
members of their national bar.272 Japanese, in-house quasi-law
yers are not admitted any bar,273 and thereby this line of logic
would deny them the protection of the attorney-client privi-
lege. 274
b. Expectation of Confidentiality and Lack of Japanese
Privileges
Because the attorney-client privilege is partially based on
the expectation of confidentiality, 275 some commentators argue
that the Japanese in-house lawyers must be denied the privi-
lege.276 One reason these commentators give is the lack of a
comparable privilege in Japan.277 There are no Japanese statutes
that protect nationals from testifying at oral depositions or im-
pose penalties for doing SO. 2 78 If such statutes existed, it would
be reasonable to extend the U.S. equivalent of these statutes to
Japanese individuals.279 Neither the old nor the new Japanese
CCP list in-house lawyers as part of a class that should receive any
sort of privilege.28 0 Such an omission is generally viewed as in-
211 F. Supp. 85 (Dist. Del. 1962) (holding that in-house patent officers did not get
privilege due to lack of local bar membership); see also United Shoe, 89 F. Supp. at 360
(denying protection of attorney-client privilege to members of corporate patent depart-
ments who were not members of any state's bar).
272. See Black, supra note 14, at 85 (describing lack of local bar membership appli-
cation to Japanese non-bar legal personnel).
273. See Kato, supra note 19, at 653 (explaining thatJapanese-quasi-lawyers receive
their qualifications through exams that are less competitive than Japanese Bar).
274. See American Cynamid, 211 F. Supp. at 85 (recognizing lack of local bar mem-
bership not conclusive, but probative when determining applicability of attorney-client
privilege).
275. See Black, supra note 14 (discussing many applications of confidentiality re-
quirements for attorney-client privilege).
276. See Fujita, supra note 90 (explaining argument that attorney-client privilege
only applies to non-U.S. individuals who have privileges in their native counrty).
277. See Fox, supra note 4, at 20 (examining Japanese statutes for privileges); But
see Basat, supra note 61, at 254 (claiming that new CCP provides for attorney-client
privilege, but that this privilege has not been interpreted by Japanese courts).
278. See id. (recognizing that lack of privileges in Japan is due to low level of dis-
covery under Japanese civil procedure).
279. See Fujita, supra note 90 (recognizing and rejecting argument that many civil
law countries do not recognize attorney-client privilege, so individuals from these na-
tions should not be granted privilege in U.S. courts).
280. See CCP, supra note 57, art. 281 (listing professionals 'receiving testimony priv-
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tentional, 28 ' resulting in Japanese in-house lawyers having no ex-
pectation of confidentiality and having no reason for the exten-
sion of the attorney-client privilege.2 82
c. Japanese Legal Education is Not Equivalent
While the Japanese in-house legal personnel do have a legal
education,8 3 many scholars feel it does not meet the same stan-
dards as the U.S. education. 284 The focus of the Japanese legal
education is different from that of U.S. legal education and stu-
dents are taught to understand theory as opposed to analytical
reasoning.285 Proponents of this argument claim that Japanese
legal education does not subject students to rigorous analytical
or ethical training. 28 6 Most students can pass Japanese legal
courses without attending class because only a few courses re-
quire attendance.28 v Graduates of undergraduate law programs
may lack the critical skills needed for the attorney-client privi-
ilege, including doctors, dentists, midwives, and bengoshi). See also Naito, supra note 18,
at 3 (explaining CCP testimony privilege and defining the individuals who receive its
protection).
281. See Naito, supra note 18, at 3 (noting that CCP grants privilege to non-Japa-
nese lawyers who have received permission to practice in Japan, but not to in-house
counsel).
282. See id. at 2-4 (explaining effects of Japan's new CCP). The theory that Japa-
nese in-house legal personnel have no expectation of confidentiality loses strength with
adoption of the new CCP. Id. The new CCP allows protection for any documents pri-
marily for the benefit of the holder. See NEW CCP, supra note 61, art. 220 (granting
privilege to documents primarily for holder's benefit). This provision may be inter-
preted to extend privilege to documents created by in-house legal personnel for en-
tirely internal use. See Naito, supra note 18, at 5 (explaining uncertainty about applica-
tion of New CCP Article 220). There are no court decisions using this article yet, so it is
unknown if the court will apply it to in-house legal personnel. Id.
283. See Kato, supra note 19, at 629 (examining differences between U.S. and Japa-
nese legal education systems).
284. See id. at 630 (considering U.S. legal education better education than Japa-
nese legal training).
285. See id. at 630-31 (describing U.S. and Japanese law classes). Japanese law
classes are taught in the lecture method and focus on interpretation of legal texts, while
the U.S. law classes focus on analysis of cases taught through the Socratic method. Id.
286. See Miller, supra note 52, at 37 (examining Japanese legal education). U.S.
ethical training involves the application of prinicpals to actual fact patterns to deter-
mine practicle results. See Brown, A Lawyer by any Other Name: Legal Advisors in Japan, in
CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN 1983 ? 233 (Lincon & Rosenthol
ed., 1983) (contrasting U.S. legal education with Japan's which focuses on memoriza-
tion of statutes and codes).
287. See id. (finding extensive absenteeism in Japanese law classes).
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lege to apply.288 Especially in the case of non-bar legal person-
nel, it is difficult to distinguish between legal and non-legal work
done by in-house legal personnel.289  The attorney-client privi-
lege only applies to legal work, and some scholars believe that
courts should not apply the privilege when the individual's work
is a mix between business and legal work.2 9 °
d. Lack of Independence
Some scholars are concerned with the lack of independence
of in-house legal personnel. 291  Proponents of this argument
claim that in-house legal personnel are overly influenced by
their employers. 29 2 They fear that the in-house legal personnel's
dependency on'the corporation for ajob will result in their pro-
fessional judgment being impaired.293 With in-house legal per-
sonnel, the corporation also may exercise direct control over the
individual.29 4 Scholars contend that combining the issues of di-
288. See Kato, supra note 19, at 631 (discussing skills learned through U.S. and
Japanese legal education).
289. See Kandel, supra note 27, at 526 (describing mixed nature of in-house legal
personnel work); see also Giesel, supra note 21, at 1172 (explaining that in-house legal
personnel, especially non-bar legal personnel, are often involved in all areas of corpo-
ration's work, making it difficult to determine whether communications are legal or
non-legal in nature). It is possible to distinguish between legal and non-legal advice
within a communication, and a U.S. court may apply the privilege to the legal part of a
communication without protecting non-legal information. Id.
290. See Black, supra note 14, at 145-51 (citing cases denying privilege to docu-
ments containing mixed business and legal advice); see also Kramer v. Raymond Corp.,
1992 U.S. Dist. Lexis 7418, 7419 (1992) (declining to apply attorney-client privilege to
minutes of corporation's liability management team which was guided by in-house
counsel because information contained in reports was actually business advice); see also
National Farmers Union Property & Casualty Co. v. District Court, 718 P.2d 1044, 1049
(1986) (holding that memorandum from outside counsel to in-house counsel was not
privileged because information contained in memo was related to business concerns
not legal issues); see also In re GrandJury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504, 512 (1979) (refusing
to apply attorney-client privilege to internal investigations done at request of in-house
counsel because this investigation was not inherently related to legal advice).
291. See Securities Exchange Council v. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc., 518 F.
Supp. 675, 680 (D.C. Dist. 1981) (questioning validity of attorney-client privilege appli-
cation to in-house legal personnel).
292. See Hill, supra note 17, at 182 (concerned with corporate influence on in-
house legal personnel's ability to make independent legal judgments without considera-
tion of corporate buisness needs).
293. See Fujita, supra note 90 (doubting ability of in-house legal personnel to coun-
sel corporation professionally due to in-house counsels' interest in financial success of
their corporation).
294. See Hill, supra note 17, at 182 (explaining possiblity of corporate control over
decision making power of in-house legal personnel).
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rect control and impairment of professional judgment present a
strong argument against applying the privilege.295
III. JAPANESE IN-HO USE LEGAL PERSONNEL QUALIFY FOR
APPLICATION OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE
If courts apply the functional equivalence test to the Japa-
nese in-house, legal personnel, it will show that they perform a
similar function to U.S. lawyers. Courts will be ignoring the re-
quirement of bar membership, in favor of the requirement that
the advice rendered be legal in nature. This application will rec-
ognize the amount of legal advice that in-house legal personnel
provide for a corporation. It will also show that the in-house
legal personnel have legal training and are employed specifically
for the purpose of giving legal advice. Because these are re-
quirements for attorney-client privilege, application of the privi-
lege recognizes that one can receive the equivalent of U.S. legal
education without attending the equivalent of a U.S. law school.
The functional equivalence test 296 is applicable in the case of
Japanese in-house legal personnel, because the distinctions be-
tween in-house legal personnel and bengoshi is very similar to the
distinctions between French in-house counsel and independent
lawyers discussed in Remy Martin.29 7 The services provided by the
French avocat and conseiljuridique are similar to those provided
by the Japanese bengoshi.29" Neither French nor Japanese law
forbids in-house legal personnel from providing legal advice for
their corporation. 299 The only distinction is that in France, in-
house legal personnel are forbidden from the bar while in Ja-
pan, the lack of bar membership is promoted predominantly by
295. See id. (explaining concern over application of attorney-client privilege to in-
house legal personnel because corporation is individual's only client, and may have a
strong influence on this lawyer's professional judgment).
296. See supra notes 190-92 and accopmanying text (discussing functional equiva-
lence test).
297. See supra notes 183-87 and accompanying text (discussing distinctions be-
tween French in house counsel and either avocats or conseilsjuridique).
298. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text (discussing functions of French
avocats and conseilsjuridique); see also supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing bengoshi functions).
299. See supra notes 90, 195 and accompanying text (discussing Japanese and
French laws regarding permission of in-house legal personnel to render legal advice to
corporation).
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the corporations themselves.3 °°
While bengoshi are experts on Japanese law and receive their
license after extensive studying, the in-house legal personnel are
the Japanese experts on U.S. law. 3 1 They have either studied
U.S. law or are working in conjunction with U.S. lawyers.3 02 In
either situation, these individuals will be giving the legal advice
enabling compliance with U.S. law that the privilege is designed
to promote. Applying the privilege only to bengoshi will result in
Japanese corporations getting flawed advice on U.S. law, and
good advice on Japanese law. In order for the corporations to
receive substantial adequate advice regarding U.S. law, courts
must extend the privilege to the in-house legal personnel.
Quasi-lawyer expertise on U.S. law also means that in-house
legal personnel do not have the equivalent education of U.S.
lawyers. Even though non-bengoshi do not attend LTRI, their ed-
ucation regarding U.S. law is not any less than that of bengoshi.
Legal education received at LTRI prepares students to become
bengoshi, who are experts on Japanese law."" The extent of the
bengoshi's knowledge of U.S. law often is gained during under-
graduate study.304 The non-bengoshi, however, often supplement
this education with lectures and study guides. 30 5  The non-
bengoshi have a better understanding of U.S. law, making them
more appropriate recipients of the attorney-client privilege than
the bengoshi.
In a similar vein, if the Japanese in-house legal personnel
are not experts on U.S. law, they will be acting as an agent of the
attorney for providing information to the corporation. U.S.
courts must apply the privilege to the agents of U.S. attorneys
acting in Japan as they would to agents in the United States. 0 6
300. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text (discussing Japanese corporate
hiring policies' effects on bar membership numbers).
301. See supra note 94-95 and accompanying text (discussing education ofJapanese
bengoshi and quasi-lawyers regarding U.S. law).
302. See supra note 261 and accompanying text (explaining Japanese quasi-lawyer
connections to U.S. law).
303. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text (discussing LTRI training and
bengoshi functions).
304. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text (discussing Japanese undergrad-
uate law courses).
305. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (discussing quasi-lawyer suppli-
mentary education regarding U.S. law).
306. See supra notes 258-60 and accompanying text (discussing application of attor-
ney-client privilege to subordinates of U.S. lawyers).
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If the courts do not apply the attorney-client privilege this way,
U.S. courts will be unable to. provide equitable judgments in
cases involving Japanese corporations, because the U.S. party will
be receiving an unfair advantage. If courts apply the privilege to
the Japanese in-house legal personnel as subordinates or agents
of U.S. attorneys, the strict privilege arguments no longer apply.
The language of the attorney-client privilege states that the com-
munication in question must be between a client and a lawyer or
his subordinate. °7 While the attorney-client privilege may not
apply to the legal personnel in their capacity as lawyers, it defi-
nitely applies to them as subordinates of U.S. lawyers.30 8
The arguments proposing that the lack of an expectation of
confidentiality 9 is due to a lack of Japanese privileges become
less realistic under the provisions of the new CCP. The "primar-
ily for the use of the holder" exceptions to document produc-
tion give the in-house legal personnel a form of privilege. 1 0
This will add a new expectation of confidentiality to the list qual-
ifications for the privilege. Even the old CCP, however, does not
require document production except under limited circum-
stances t.3 1  This limited discovery creates the reasonable assump-
tion by Japanese corporations that all of their internal docu-
ments will be inherently confidential, especially those produced
by in-house, legal personnel.
The issue of independence3 12 is not relevant because the ar-
gument applies equally to all in-house counsel, regardless of
whether they are members of a bar.3 1 ' Because the U.S.
Supreme Court has determined that the attorney-client privilege
307. See supra notes 25-48 and accompanying text (explaining application of attor-
ney-client privilege).
308. See supra note 261 and accompanying text (discussing howJapanese in-house
legal personnel act as subordinates of U.S. lawyers).
309. See supra notes 275-82 and accompanying text (discussing arguments relating
to absence of Japanese discovery privileges and lack of expectation of confidentiality).
310. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text (explaining Japanese holder ex-
ceptions to document production).
311. See supra notes 150-58 and accompanying text (discussing limited circum-
stances requiring document production in Japanese courts under old CCP).
312. See supra notes 291-95 and accompanying text (discussing arguments of Japa-
nese in-house personnel's lack of independence)
313. See supra notes 293-94 and accompanying text (discussing application of lack
of independence argument to U.S. in-house lawyers).
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applies to all U.S. in-house lawyers,314 the independence issue
has been resolved. If U.S. in-house lawyers are not denied the
privilege because they are interested in the financial success of
the corporation, neither should Japanese legal personnel.
CONCLUSION
While the arguments on both sides of this issue are strong,
those favoring the application of the attorney-client privilege to
Japanese in-house legal personnel are stronger. These argu-
ments are rooted in the purposes behind the attorney-client priv-
ilege and the very nature of the U.S. judicial system. If Japanese
corporations are to comply with U.S. law, and U.S. courts are to
render fair judgments, the in-house legal personnel must be al-
lowed to invoke the attorney-client privilege.
314. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. Supreme Court ap-
plication of attorney-client privilege to U.S. in-house lawyers).
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